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MODERNIZING THE ARMY’S UTILITY HELICOPTER FLEET 






The purpose of this MBA Project was to recommend force development solutions, 
in terms of capabilities, to meet the United States Army’s future utility helicopter 
requirements.  The last thorough review of requirements for the utility helicopter fleet of 
the future was conducted in 2000.  This project focuses on changes that have occurred in 
the Army since then and the extent to which various alternative courses of action address 
those changes. 
The report begins by briefly considering changes in the Army’s operational 
environment.  Next the authors consider what the requirements will be for the utility 
helicopter as the Army transitions from its current posture to the Objective Force.  The 
study then considers possible materiel alternatives to fulfill the Objective Force 
requirements.  These alternatives are to develop a new aircraft, use an aircraft that is 
already in production, or to improve the UH-60.  The authors conclude that it is 
technically risky but feasible and cost effective to improve the UH-60 so that it can meet 
minimum future requirements, while a new aircraft acquisition option offers better 
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A.  PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to recommend force development solutions, in terms 
of capabilities, to meet the Army’s future utility helicopter requirements. 
 
B. INTRODUCTION 
1.  Background.  In 1999, the Army Project Manager, Utility Helicopters (PM-
UH) sponsored a study titled The Utility Helicopter Fleet Modernization Analysis.  The 
study recognized that the Army’s future requirements for the utility helicopter fleet far 
exceeded the capabilities of the contemporary aircraft.  The study conducted a cost as an 
independent variable (CAIV) analysis and recommended a blocked approach to attain the 
best overall fleet mix to meet current requirements.  Since 1999, the Army’s utility 
helicopter requirements and its funding priorities have changed as it has shifted its long-
range planning from the Army After Next concept to Transformation and the Objective 
Force. PM-UH is currently sponsoring another study to determine how the changing 
needs of the Army will affect the utility helicopter fleet 
2.  Project Objectives.  This research project is specifically focused on the 
following primary research question: What should be the Army’s strategy for 
modernizing the utility helicopter fleet to meet Objective Force requirements? 
The subsidiary research questions are:  What has changed in the Army operational 
environment since the 1999 study was published, and to what extent are the study’s 
assumptions affected by these changes?  What are the Army’s Objective Force utility 
helicopter requirements, and how well does the UH-60 meet those requirements?  To 
what extent is the plan to evolve the existing UH-60 to meet future requirements 
technically feasible?  What alternatives exist to meet future requirements other than 




1. Identify changes in the operational environment since the 1999 studies and 
consider the potential impacts of these changes on capabilities planning for the utility 
helicopter fleet. 
2. Identify relevant Objective Force requirements. 
3. Assess the extent to which materiel solutions meet Objective Force 
requirements. 
4. Compare the UH-60X, NDI alternatives and a potential new acquisition 
program against each other in terms of capabilities and cost. 
 
D. ANALYSIS 
 1. Changes in the Operational Environment.  In the Department of 
Defense, there are three primary changes that will affect the future of the utility 
helicopter fleet.  First is the shift from threat-based planning to capability-based planning, 
and the second is the mandate from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide 
interoperable, joint capabilities in our weapons systems.  Third is the Army leadership’s 
response to these changes that will in turn affect the future of the utility helicopter fleet. 
2. Objective Force and UH-60 Helicopter Requirements.  Despite several 
relatively minor discrepancies, the current UH-60 ORD acknowledges Objective Force 
requirements and concepts, and attempts to address them within the developmental 
constraints of the existing aircraft.  This may not always be technically possible, 
however.  UH-60 shortfalls in regard to meeting Objective Force requirements include 
issues in the areas of lift capability, interoperability, flight handling characteristics, 
survivability, and supportability. 
3. The UH-60 Upgrade Plan.  It appears to be technically feasible to meet 
the Army’s future lift requirements with the development of an improved engine, 
transmission, and rotor system for the UH-60 – which will require airframe 
modifications.  There appears to be little cost, schedule, or performance risk with the 
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Army’s ten-year plan to develop the new engine, but there may be significant technical 
risk in modifying the airframe to accommodate a larger rotor system.  It is also 
technically feasible to improve the flight handling characteristics of the UH-60 and 
improve its performance in a degraded visual environment.  Finally, the UH-60 may also 
be able to meet the Army’s requirement for increased reliability, based on the results of 
computer modeling. 
4. Materiel Alternatives to the UH-60.  No aircraft currently in production 
meets the Army’s requirements for lift capacity and improved flight handling 
characteristics.  The only aircraft in production that meets the Army’s lift requirement is 
the CH-47, which does not meet survivability or flight handling characteristics.  The only 
fly-by-wire aircraft currently in production is the French NH-90, which was screened 
from consideration due to insufficient lift.  Average unit procurement costs for a new 
acquisition program would be approximately  $18.3 million per helicopter, with a 
required design and development cost on the order of $885 million over about fourteen 
and a half years.  
 
E. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. UH-60M Upgrade Program 
Implement Fly-by-Wire.  The UH-60’s lack of improved flight handling 
characteristics is a serious requirements shortfall, given the Army requirement to conduct 
precision troop and equipment insertions in all weather and environmental conditions. 
In the current two conflicts, more utility aircraft have been lost due to brown-out 
accidents than any other cause, including enemy fire.  As the Army focuses more on 
asymmetric conflicts, all-weather operation becomes more critical.  In a symmetric 
battlefield, bad weather tends to affect both forces engaged.  In an asymmetric conflict, 
however, where the United States and its allies are the only force with a significant 
aviation capability, poor weather will limit friendly capabilities more than the enemy’s.  
Without an all-weather capability, inclement weather favors enemy operations. 
 3
A fly-by-wire flight control system is needed to meet these requirements, as well 
as meeting lift and supportability requirements.  Because no production aircraft has ever 
been upgraded to a fly-by-wire flight control system, though, this entails moderate 
technical risk.  A fly-by-wire flight control system may stress the airframe in 
unpredictable ways, which may require airframe strengthening or other modifications, 
which may affect aircraft weight or center of gravity.   
The Utility Helicopter project office estimates that the fly-by-wire upgrade 
program will have RDT&E costs of $55 million dollars, and increase the average unit 
procurement cost of the UH-60M by $600,000.  Fully funding the fly-by-wire program 
and accelerating its introduction, beginning in fiscal year 2007 if possible, will fulfill a 
crucial component of the acquisition strategy and provide critical operational capability.   
Upgrade the UH-60M engine.  The Army must develop a new, more powerful 
engine to meet lift requirements, whether it pursues the UH-60X upgrade program or a 
new aircraft design program.  Designing the new engine to be compatible with the current 
UH-60M drive train will allow integration of the new engine into the UH-60M upgrade 
program.   
The new, more powerful engine could be governed to prevent over-torques, and 
allow the aircraft to operate up to the limits of the existing transmission.  Given the 
existing drive train limitations, the UH-60M could lift up to 7,600 pounds at 4,000 feet 
and 95 degrees with more powerful engines.  This would be a 27 percent increase in 
maximum lift capacity over the current UH-60M. 
The Utility Helicopter project office estimates that the proposed new engine 
developed through the Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) would have a unit cost 
of roughly $1 million, which is approximately $350,000 more than the current 701D 
engine in the UH-60M.  This would increase the average unit procurement cost of the 
UH-60M from $10.6 million to $11.0 million.  This appears to be a very cost effective 
upgrade, increasing lift capacity by 27 percent while only increasing unit cost by 4 
percent, and allowing the Army to capitalize on the significant RDT&E cost of the new 
engine for the UH-60X/FUR program. 
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 2. UH-60X / Future Utility Rotorcraft 
Non-developmental aircraft do not meet Army requirements.  No aircraft 
currently in production meets the Army’s requirements for lift capacity and improved 
flight handling characteristics.  The only aircraft in production that meets the Army’s lift 
requirement is the CH-47, which does not meet survivability or flight handling 
characteristics.  The only fly-by-wire aircraft currently in production is the French NH-
90, which was screened from consideration due to insufficient lift. 
Pursue a new utility helicopter to meet Future Utility Rotorcraft 
requirements.  Meeting requirements by making further modifications to the current 
UH-60M upgrade plan appears to be more affordable than a new acquisition program, at 
least in the short term.  The Army’s Utility Helicopter Project Office estimates that 
producing an upgraded UH-60X that meets all requirements will have an average unit 
procurement cost of roughly $15 million per helicopter.  Parametric estimates for a new 
acquisition program suggest that a new utility helicopter meeting lift capacity 
requirements might have an average unit procurement cost of approximately $18.3 
million. However, evolving the UH-60M to the UH-60X involves high technical risk, 
according to program definitions of risk.  Ultimately, even if none of the technical risks 
develop into significant cost or schedule overruns, and the UH-60X meets performance 
thresholds, the Army will have a $15 million upgrade to a 20-year old (plus) airframe that 
marginally meets a lift requirement written in 1999.  The Army should consider a new 
acquisition program to design a new aircraft to meet Objective Force requirements.  The 
new aircraft could be designed around an improved engine that could be retrofitted to the 
current UH-60M.  This would allow the Army to capitalize on the engine design cost for 
its new helicopter and provide significant increased lift capability for the rest of the utility 
helicopter fleet. 
Re-evaluate the 9,000 pound external lift requirement in light of cost data. 
An analysis of alternatives using cost as an independent variable (CAIV) analysis would 
determine the program risk associated with stretching the UH-60 airframe to achieve the 
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full 9,000-pound lift requirement.  Initial engineering estimates indicate that a new engine 
and transmission, with the existing rotor system, would allow the UH-60M to lift 8,600 
pounds at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees. This upgrade would increase the unit production 
cost of the UH-60M by approximately $850,000.  Further increasing lift capacity to 9,000 
pounds will require a larger rotor system, which in turn requires extending the airframe to 
provide clearance between the main and tail rotors.  This upgrade might increase the unit 
production cost by as much as an additional $3 million.   
Our analysis suggests that a UH-60 with an improved engine, transmission, and 
fly-by-wire capability will cost $12 million and provide 8600 pounds external lift.  As 
previously mentioned, the UH-60X will provide 9000 pounds lift and cost approximately 
$15 million.  It seems that increasing lift from 8600 pounds to 9000 pounds will cost 
about $3 million.  We recommend that the Army study the impact of reducing the 
objective lift requirement to the more affordable 8600 pounds.  
A near-term alternative to lengthening the UH-60 airframe is to transfer some 
utility helicopter tasks to the CH-47, especially considering that an upgraded UH-60M 
might only fall 400 pounds short of the Objective Force lift requirement.   
Study the cost and feasibility of a single new development aircraft to fulfill 
both utility and cargo roles in the Objective Force.  Objective Force literature 
(specifically the FCS ORD) describes roles for the UH-60 and the CH-47 that are quite 
similar.  The practice of maintaining two platforms to fulfill the single basic mission of 
aerial transport contradicts the stated Objective Force goals of non-contiguous operations, 
reach-back logistics, systems commonality, and exceptional reliability.  If affordable, a 
future cargo/utility rotorcraft capable of both the UH-60’s versatility and the CH-47’s 
cargo capacity, with increased reliability, supportability, and survivability, could be the 
ideal solution to Objective Force requirements, especially if developed in coordination 
with a system to fulfill the requirements the Army has identified for an Air Mobility 




3. Requirements Determination 
Define requirements in terms of capabilities.  When determining both 
requirements and the criteria for the analysis of alternatives, consider the shift away from 
threat-based requirements to capabilities-based requirements.  In light of the Department 
of Defense’s current and probable future emphasis on inter-service integration, including 
commonality of processes and equipment, the requirements development effort for the 
FUR requires the fullest possible representation from other services and agencies 
Quantify all requirements.  Some of the requirements identified in the ORD for 
the UH-60M and the FUR are not quantitatively defined.  For example, neither 
survivability nor supportability requirements are well-defined in Objective Force 
literature, and consequently are not well-addressed in the UH-60 ORD.  Specifically 


























The purpose of this study is to recommend force development solutions, in terms 
of capabilities, to meet the Army’s future utility helicopter requirements. 
 
B. BACKGROUND 
In 1999, the Army Project Manager, Utility Helicopters (PM-UH) sponsored a 
study titled the Utility Helicopter Fleet Modernization Analysis.  The study recognized 
that the Army’s future requirements for the utility helicopter fleet far exceeded the 
capabilities of the contemporary aircraft.  The study conducted a cost as an independent 
variable (CAIV) analysis and recommended a blocked approach to attain the best overall 
fleet mix to meet requirements.  Since 1999, the Army’s utility helicopter requirements 
and its funding priorities have changed as it has shifted its long-range planning from the 
Army After Next concept to Transformation and the Objective Force.  Currently, PM-UH 
is commissioning another study to determine how the changing needs of the Army will 
affect the utility helicopter fleet. 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research project is specifically focused on the following primary research 
question: 
What should be the Army’s strategy for modernizing the utility helicopter 
fleet to meet Objective Force requirements? 
The subsidiary research questions are: 
1. What has changed in the Army operational environment since the 1999 
study was published, and to what extent are the study’s assumptions affected by these 
changes?  
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2. What are the Army’s Objective Force utility helicopter lift requirements, 
and how well does the UH-60 meet those requirements?   
3. To what extent is the plan to evolve the existing UH-60 to meet future 
requirements technically feasible? 




The scope of this report is limited to the utility helicopter requirements of the 
Objective Force, and the degree to which various solutions fulfill those requirements.  
The body of literature that supports this study includes defense planning rules and 
policies, Army Objective Force concept and requirements documentation, previous utility 
helicopter program studies and plans, helicopter industry technical and engineering data, 
and various articles, both scholarly and popular, regarding utility helicopters and the 
Army Objective Force. 
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
1. Identify changes in the operational environment since the 1999 studies 
and consider the potential impacts of these changes on capabilities planning for the 
utility helicopter fleet. 
 a. Conduct research to determine what changes have occurred and 
how these changes might affect future utility helicopter planning. 
 b. Make recommendations about new factors that planners should 
consider when deciding about the future of the utility helicopter fleet. 
2. Identify relevant Objective Force requirements.  
a. Review UH-60 and Objective Force requirements documentation 
to identify utility lift requirements for the Objective Force. 
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b. Crosswalk UH-60 to Objective Force requirements to ensure UH-
60 requirements meet objective force needs. 
c. Identify UH-60 requirements that have not been met by the current 
aircraft.   
3. Assess the extent to which materiel solutions meet Objective Force 
requirements. 
a. Assess the feasibility of a plan to recapitalize the existing UH-60 
fleet to ORD-compliant UH-60X aircraft. 
(1) Review cost, schedule, and performance estimates from the 
project office. 
(2) Research industry trends and consult with technical experts 
to estimate the feasibility of the proposed upgrades. 
(3) Compare estimates of technical performance to Objective 
Force requirements. 
b. Consider implications of a new helicopter acquisition program. 
(1) Research non-developmental item (NDI) alternatives to 
meet the requirements, including the overall benefits and limitations of NDIs as well as 
specific NDI systems. 
(2) Research past development programs to estimate the cost 
and schedule for developing a new utility helicopter. 
4. Compare the UH-60X, NDI alternatives and a potential new 
acquisition program against each other in terms of capabilities and cost. 
 
F.   THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I:  Introduction.  Identifies the focus and purpose of this project as well 
as the primary and subsidiary research questions. 
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Chapter II:  Background.  Provides a basic overview of the evolution of the 
UH-60 helicopter fleet.   
Chapter III:  Analysis of Changes in the Operational Environment.  
Describes recent changes in the defense environment and how these changes may affect 
the utility helicopter fleet. 
Chapter IV:  Objective Force And UH-60 Helicopter Requirements Analysis.  
Outlines the requirements placed on the utility helicopter fleet by emerging Objective 
Force doctrine. 
Chapter V:  Analysis of the UH-60 Upgrade Plan.  Explores the technical 
feasibility of evolving the UH-60 to meet the requirements of the Objective Force. 
Chapter VI:  Analysis of Materiel Alternatives to the UH-60.  Identifies non-
developmental candidates to meet the utility helicopter requirements and explores new 
acquisition alternatives. 
Chapter VII:  Findings and Recommendations.  Summarizes the findings of 





A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide background information on the current 
state of the Army’s utility helicopter fleet.  The chapter includes information on the 
origins of the UH-60, its development history, and current recapitalization programs that 
the UH-60 program is undertaking.  The chapter concludes by describing the Army's 
specific acquisition strategy. 
 
B.   THE BLACK HAWK FLEET 
The UH-60 series comprises the Army’s utility helicopter fleet, and is the largest 
aircraft fleet in the Army at 1570 helicopters.  Black Hawks fly 42% of total Army rotary 
wing flight hours, and have recently seen extensive use in the global war on terrorism, 
Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom.  Procurement of Black 
Hawks dates to 1978 with the purchase of the first UH-60A models from Sikorsky 
Aircraft Corporation. 
In 1989, Sikorsky began production of the UH-60L.  The ‘L’ model featured a 
more powerful engine and an improved durability gearbox that together produced more 
lift.  By this time, the first -A models were over ten years old, and were beginning to 
experience some problems associated with an aging fleet. An aging fleet is plagued with 
rising operating and support (O&S) costs, as well as increasing safety concerns.  
According to data provided by the utility helicopter project office, the readiness rates of 
the UH-60A fleet have experienced a steady decline as depicted in Figure 1.  1 
                                                 
1 Source:  AEPCO Utility Helicopter Data, personal correspondence, Nov. 2003. 
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Figure 1.   UH-60A Declining Readiness Rates 
 
By 1999, Army aviation planners needed to decide how to best support the Army 
as Army doctrine and tactics changed.  The planners also knew that they needed to 
address the issue of an aging fleet, and that affordability was a top priority.  To this end, 
the Directorate of Combat Developments at Ft Rucker, Alabama initiated an effort to 
develop an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for the recapitalization of the 
UH-60 fleet.  At the same time, the Army’s Project Manager, Utility Helicopter 
recognized the need to pave the way for the utility helicopter of the future.  According to 
members of the PM office, “The aging fleet was becoming too costly to operate and 
maintain and the outdated technology of the 1970s proved incompatible with the Army's 
new vision for the future”. [Ref. 1]  To this end, the PM sponsored a study with the 
following stated purpose: 
The Utility Helicopter Fleet Modernization Analysis was 
sponsored by the Project Manager, Utility Helicopter (PM-UH); in 
coordination with Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA); 
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); 
and the U.S. Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC).  The study purpose was 
to develop a Utility Helicopter Fleet Modernization Strategy that 
determines the most operationally effective and affordable program to 
modernize the Utility Helicopter fleet to meet emerging Force XXI and 
Army After Next (AAN) operational requirements during the time period 
FY00-FY25.  The products of this analysis will be used by HQDA, 
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Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS)- (DAMO-FDV) and the 
PM-UH to support aviation force structure requirements for FY99 and 
beyond. [Ref. 2, Executive Summary] 
Army analysis and fleet modernization studies resulted in a strategy to extend the 
life of some of the existing airframes until such time as technologies matured that would 
allow production of helicopters with greater capabilities.  The two major components of 
this strategy are a rebuild program and an upgrade program. 
The rebuild program is necessary to extend the life of the UH-60A fleet until the 
technology that is necessary for the upgrade program is available.  By the time that this 
technology matures, about 38% of the fleet will be over twenty years old.  The rebuild 
program is a relatively low-cost strategy to extend the service life of the UH-60A fleet 
and slow the growth rate of the fleet’s average age.  It will improve readiness and reduce 
O&S costs, and will allow application of airframe improvements.  The program takes ‘A’ 
model aircraft and overhauls them at a depot.  The ‘A’ model helicopter is then returned 
to the fleet in a nearly new condition.  This rebuild program is referred to as “‘A’ to ‘A’ 
recapitalization”.  
The upgrade program takes an evolutionary approach to helicopter acquisition, 
and seeks to improve the UH-60 fleet by including greater capabilities for the aircraft as 
they become available.  The plan groups upgrades into two developmental blocks, 
referred to as Block I and Block II.  Block I helicopters will be called the UH-60M, and 
will include several technologies that can be matured by 2007.  Block II helicopters will 
include advances in engine technology that are scheduled to be available by about 2015.  
The Block II helicopter is called the Future Utility Rotorcraft (FUR), and current Army 
planning calls for the eventual fielding of 255 FURs.The upgrade plan includes the fleet 
modernization analysis recommendations for upgrades through recapitalization (recap/ 
upgrade).  This means that the program will take the fleet’s aging UH-60A and UH-60L 
model aircraft, strip them of worn or obsolete components, refurbish the airframes, and 
rebuild them into nearly new UH-60M aircraft.  Concurrent with this program will be the 
purchase of new UH-60M aircraft from Sikorsky.  A summary of the enhancements that 
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Figure 2.   UH-60M Walk-Around Chart 
 
The above paragraphs described the evolution of the UH-60 fleet through Block I 
improvements that will produce the UH-60M.  As previously mentioned, the Block II 
helicopter is referred to as the Future Utility Rotorcraft.  According to the UH-PM, 
Colonel William Lake, the specific materiel form that the FUR will take will be decided 
after the Army conducts an analysis of alternatives.  If the FUR is a further improvement 
to the UH-60 series, it will likely be called the UH-60X.  For clarity, this study continues 
to use the UH-60X designation when referring to any Block II alternative that uses the 
existing UH-60 airframe.  The FUR title is reserved for non-UH-60-based alternatives. 
The Block I upgrades described above were appropriate for the needs of the Army 
when they were developed.  However, as the world situation changes so do the 
implications for the utility helicopter program.  The requirements previously identified 
for Block II aircraft may no longer be appropriate.    The Army Aviation community 
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recognizes the need to update the ORD, and is currently in the process of doing so, with 
potential impact to the project’s development priorities.   
Since the last UH-60 ORD was published in 2001, there has been a shift in how 
the Department of Defense determines requirements.  This shift, and its consequences, 
will be discussed in Chapter III. 
 
C. THE UTILITY HELICOPTER ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
 The Army has a specific acquisition strategy that is based on requirements and 
funding.  The plan through 2025 is to field a total of 1325 UH-60 series aircraft, and to 
field 255 Future Utility Rotorcrafts. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter described the evolution of the Black Hawk fleet, from the UH-60A 
model beginning in 1978, through the UH-60L beginning in 1989 to the Block I UH-60M 
scheduled for full-rate production in 2007.  The Block II aircraft is referred to as the 
Future Utility Rotorcraft and has production predicted to begin in about 2015.  Current 
Army planning requires a fleet of 1325 UH-60 series aircraft and 255 FURs for the year 
2025. 
The most recently published ORD is the ORD for the Recapitalization of the UH-
60 Black Hawk Utility Helicopter Fleet.  It was prepared for a 2001 Milestone B 
decision. 
The FUR requirements will likely change as the result of new guidance from the 
Army and the Department of Defense.  Chapter III will discuss the changing nature of the 
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III. ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN THE OPERATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to present data on some of the changes that have 
occurred in the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Army operational environment, 
and analyze the effects that those changes will have on future planning for the utility 
helicopter fleet. 
In DoD, there are three primary changes that will affect the future of the utility 
helicopter fleet.  First is the shift from threat-based planning to capability-based planning, 
and second is the mandate from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide 
interoperable, joint capabilities in our weapon systems.  Third is the Army leadership’s 
response to these changes that will in turn affect the future of the utility helicopter fleet.   
 
B.   DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PARADIGM SHIFT 
This section outlines two major paradigm shifts in defense planning.  The first is 
the result of the most recent Quadrennial Defense Review and the second is a change to 
the requirements generation process known as the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System. 
 
1.   Quadrennial Defense Review 
The Quadrennial Defense Review is required as part of the United States Code, 
Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 2, Sec. 118: 
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The Secretary of Defense shall every four years, … conduct a 
comprehensive examination (to be known as a ''quadrennial defense 
review'') of the national defense strategy, force structure, force 
modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, and other elements of the 
defense program and policies … with a view toward determining and 
expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a 
defense program for the next 20 years. Each such quadrennial defense 
review shall be conducted in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. [Ref. 14] 
The last QDR, which was published on September 30, 2001, identified a 
paradigm shift from “threat-based” planning to “capabilities-based” planning.  The 
distinction is best defined in the QDR report: 
A central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defense 
planning from a “threat-based” model that has dominated thinking in the 
past to a “capabilities-based” model for the future. This capabilities-based 
model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than 
specifically whom the adversary might be or where a war might 
occur…the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter 
and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and 
asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives. 
Adopting this capabilities-based approach to planning requires that 
the nation maintain its military advantages in key areas while it develops 
new areas of military advantage and denies asymmetric advantages to 
adversaries. It entails adapting existing military capabilities to new 
circumstances, while experimenting with the development of new military 
capabilities. [Ref. 15, p. IV] 
The implications of capabilities based planning on the UH-60 fleet are beginning 
to be explored to an increasing degree.  Under threat-based planning against the Soviet 
threat, determination of requirements was easier in many respects.  On a linear battlefield 
against an enemy whose capabilities are largely known there are fewer variables than on 
a non-linear battlefield. 
To conduct thorough capabilities-based planning we must develop a greater 
appreciation for the range of tasks that the Army might be called upon to execute.  The 
RAND corporation suggests that a “new analytical architecture is needed with 
modernized constructs for: 
• Identifying capability needs 
• Assessing capability options for effectiveness in …missions 
• Making choices about requirements and ways to achieve them, and doing 
so in an integrative portfolio framework that addresses future war-fighting 
capabilities, force management, risk tradeoffs, and related matters in an 
economic framework”.  [Ref. 7, p. xi] 
Using this broad range of constructs as an example, we see that the utility 
helicopter fleet must consider multiple factors.  Planners need to decide not only what the 
fleet needs to defend against, but also the extent to which its capabilities can develop to 
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serve the greater Army.  However, at the same time the utility helicopter may assume 
new capabilities-based requirements, it faces an increasing array of threats as well: 
The missiles that militants have regularly fired at planes in Iraq are 
typically Russian- designed Strelas, or SA-7s, or similar models. 
Weighing 30 pounds and measuring about five feet long, they are easy to 
smuggle across Iraq's porous borders. They can be fired as high as 14,000 
feet, beyond the normal cruising altitude... [Ref. 53, p. 1] 
Shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapons coming out of the former Soviet Union, a 
technologically savvy international terrorist organization, and the use of weapons of mass 
destruction by rogue nations or terrorist groups are all examples of possible emerging 
threats.  Newer versions of the system threat analysis report (STAR) will likely address 
the specific dangers utility helicopters will face in the future.   
New roles for the utility helicopter fleet need to be explored.  Special operations 
forces are becoming increasingly important to America, as they take on a much larger 
role in our global war on terrorism.  Another new role for the utility helicopter might 
involve command and control, or integrating the various unmanned aerial vehicles as 
they become more critical to ongoing operations. 
 
2.   Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
Consideration of joint requirements is nothing new.  The concept of joint 
requirements was born of the necessity to eliminate redundancy and promote flexibility.    
The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation in 1986 gave greater emphasis to the 
benefits of joint processes and decision-making within the Department of Defense:   
The goal of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was to give the 
CINCs a stronger voice in defining operational requirements, as well as 
the resources necessary to perform their missions. The CINCs’ 
spokesperson was the CJCS, whose job it was to integrate CINC 
requirements, prioritize them, and show how these requirements related to 
readiness. The CJCS was now responsible for providing independent 
resource assessments (e.g., readiness to resources) to SECDEF on all 
matters considered joint, which included requirements, programs, and 
budget. [Ref. 17, pp. 14-15] 
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Goldwater-Nichols legislation alone, however, did not seem to provide a thorough 
framework for ensuring truly joint requirements generation process:  “Unfortunately this 
has led the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and services to derive coordinated joint 
processes (in doctrine, training, requirements, et al.) that are stovepiped —isolated from 
one another instead of thoroughly integrated.” [Ref. 16, pp. 25-26]  
In an attempt to better integrate the requirements generation process among the 
services, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General Richard B. Myer 
recently adopted the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).  
This mandate, dated June 24, 2003 seeks to ensure that our forces are equipped with 
interoperable systems. 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
(JCIDS) has been approved. JCIDS was developed … to foster efficiency, 
flexibility, creativity and innovation. JCIDS is defined in Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Instruction 3170.01C and an accompanying CJCS 
Manual 3170.01. The manual provides guidance on how to frame the 
analysis and procedures used to identify and document capability gaps. 
JCIDS will support DoD’s aim of providing interoperable, joint 
capabilities that best satisfy the needs of future warfighters. …JCIDS sets 
the stage for transition to a process founded on joint concepts and 
integrated architectures. [Ref. 18] 
The effect that JCIDS will have on the future of the utility helicopter fleet could 
be significant.  Future utility helicopter requirements planning personnel will likely 
include members outside of the Army.  These planners might mandate that the utility 
helicopter of the future be built around a modular design that allows its configuration to 
be easily changed to meet the demands of multiple roles.  Drug interdiction packages for 
the Coast Guard, anti-submarine warfare packages for the Navy, and Homeland Defense 
implications are all examples of new considerations for planners. 
In the current world situation, with focus on Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the 
Army must guard against allowing history to repeat itself.  Admiral William Owens, 
former Vice Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, has expressed the view that “history 
reveals a tendency for the services to diverge rather than coalesce during periods of 
relative fiscal austerity. That is, each service tends to put planning priority on assuring 
and protecting core competencies at the expense of those capabilities that support and 
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facilitate operations of the other services.” [Ref. 33, p. 56]  The point of JCIDS is that, in 
an ever-shrinking world, this type of behavior is no longer viable.  Joint considerations 
must take precedence over narrow service goals, and the next-generation utility helicopter 
must answer more needs than just the Army’s. 
 
C.   THE ARMY’S RESPONSE TO CHANGING PLANNING GUIDANCE 
As described in Chapter II, the Army’s utility helicopter needs were last formally 
and thoroughly analyzed in 1999 and 2000.  At that time, much of the primary planning 
guidance and documentation for the Army came from Army After Next concepts.  This 
planning guidance helped the Army transition away from the Soviet threat.  
The Army After Next concepts were supported by then Chief of Staff of the Army 
General Dennis J. Reimer.  ”We’re changing from a Cold War Army to a post-Cold War 
Army, from an Industrial Age Army to an Information Age Army.... The process of 
taking today’s Army to what we refer to as the Army After Next is known as Force XXI.” 
[Ref. 21, pp. 2-6]  Army After Next concepts were to shape what the Army would look 
like in the year 2025. 
The next Army chief of staff, General Eric K. Shinseki, ushered in a new focus.  
When he assumed duties as chief of staff, the Department of Defense was no longer 
focused on the Soviet Union.  The United States was becoming more involved with 
operations other than war and with peace building operations.  General Shinseki’s vision 
was for the Army to become much lighter and more easily deployable. 
 ...one of his top priorities was to create an Interim Brigade Combat 
Team capable of deploying anywhere in the world within 96 hours. His 
vision of units equipped with vehicles lighter than Bradleys and Abrams 
M-1 Tanks would serve as a bridge for the Army's future Objective Force 
while providing the Army a more lethal, mobile and survivable force than 
the light forces which initially held the line in Saudi Arabia against Iraq 
during the Gulf War. [Ref. 21] 
General Shinseki’s vision of how the Army would transition itself from its then-
current posture to a more capable force of the future is known as Army Transformation.  
Transformation involves maintaining current force (also known as the Legacy Force) 
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capabilities, while working on the technological advances that will allow development of 
the Objective Force.  To capitalize on technological advances in the near term, the 
Interim Force will help bridge the gap between the Legacy and Objective Forces.  UH-60 
variants will support the Army throughout Transformation. 
Shortly after taking over in August 2003, the new Chief of Staff of the Army 
General Peter J. Schoomaker described his vision of “The Army Future Force”: 
The Army Future Force will provide joint force commanders a 
much broader array of multidimensional options in any future 
contingency. As a knowledge-based force, the Army will exploit the 
power of advanced information technologies and space-based capabilities 
to enable network-centric battle command, fully integrated within the 
emerging joint, interagency, and multinational framework. [Ref. 42, p. 5] 
General Schoomaker has also ordered the study of several proposals that will 
impact the future of the utility helicopter fleet, including a proposed reduction in the 
number of aircraft types in the Army fleet, and an increasing reliance on unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs).   
 
D.   CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 This chapter describes changes in the DoD and Army environments since the 
1999 UH-60 ORD was drafted.  These changes will be important to consider when 
planning for the future of the utility helicopter fleet.  Chapter IV will explore in detail the 
emerging requirements for utility helicopters in order to support the Army’s next 











IV. OBJECTIVE FORCE AND UH-60 HELICOPTER 
REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW   
The purpose of this chapter is to derive from the Objective Force White Paper, 
and from the refinements and recommendations that followed it in official concept 
documents, study reports, and requirements documents, as well as unofficial studies and 
sources, the specific consequences of Objective Force initiatives to the Army’s UH-60 
Black Hawk helicopter requirements.  To achieve this objective, the chapter outlines 
Objective Force operational and organizational concepts, describing overall concepts 
first, then general aviation missions, and next the implications for utility rotorcraft.  It 
then describes the current requirements for the Black Hawk helicopter, and finally 
compares the Objective Force utility rotorcraft requirements to those for the Black Hawk.  
 
B. OBJECTIVE FORCE CONCEPTS 
In November 2001, the U.S. Army published the “Objective Force White Paper”, 
outlining a revolutionary new concept for the future Army.  Endorsed by Army Chief of 
Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the white paper describes the future Army as a new force 
unhampered by the limitations of “light” and “heavy” force structures, able to conduct 
“operational maneuver from strategic distances” without recourse to traditional ports of 
debarkation, capable of decisive victory on a non-contiguous battlefield, and empowered 
to “see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively” [Ref. 49, p. iv]. 
The Army’s vision in the Objective Force White Paper and in the subsequent 
“Objective Force in 2015” white paper includes a number of changes in Army operations 
and organizations, and several distinct concepts upon which the force will be centered.  
The first and primary of these is the transformational effect of the “information 
revolution”, enabling an unprecedented and exponentially empowering level of 
situational knowledge at all levels of command and at all points on the battlefield. [Ref. 
49, p. 2]   All military functions and components, including the Army Reserves, will be 
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affected by this transformation, made possible by a global, ubiquitous, unitary command, 
control, and communications system. 
The second new concept for the Objective Force is the capability for all maneuver 
units to be dominant across the full spectrum of military operations, from major theater 
war to smaller scale contingencies to stability and support operations.  Integral to this 
concept is the need for Objective Force units to be masters at transitioning from one type 
of operation to another quickly and without losing operational momentum as typically 
occurs in such a change. [Ref. 49, pp. 3-4]  A derivative of full-spectrum dominance, as 
well as other Objective Force concepts, is the need to develop a new family of combat 
vehicles, called the Future Combat System (FCS), capable of fulfilling the full spectrum 
of missions to which the Objective Force might be assigned. [Ref. 41, p. 2]  
Third, the Army envisions the Objective Force to be much more integrated than 
the current force.  This includes intra-army integration of air, ground, maneuver, support, 
and sustainment operations, and also better interoperability with joint, inter-agency, and 
multi-national forces.  This interoperability will include the ability to conduct 
“operational maneuver from strategic distances”, and Army headquarters specifically 
designed to function as Joint Force Commands, enabling information superiority for the 
entire force by integrating it into the Army’s common operational picture. [Ref. 49, p. 6]  
Fourth, the Objective Force is optimized for success at the tactical level of war.  
Following the “see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively” principle, it aims 
to use technological enablers to achieve tactical success by “developing situations out of 
contact; maneuvering to positions of advantage; engaging enemy forces beyond the range 
of their weapons; destroying them with precision fires; and, as required, by tactical 
assault.” [Ref. 49, p. 6]  
Fifth, the Army is designing the Objective Force organization from the ground up, 
around generic unit constructs called Units of Action (UAs) and Units of Employment 
(UEs), that are roughly equivalent to today’s brigades and divisions, respectively, in 
order to shed the prejudices of the past and build a new force that is optimized to be: 
• Responsive – through the ability to conduct operational maneuver from 
strategic distances using advance multi-modal capabilities, 
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• Deployable – able to send brigade-equivalent anywhere in the world 
within 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in theater in 30 
days, without reliance on traditional ports of debarkation, 
• Agile – at transitions, enabled by superior situational information and 
training, 
• Versatile – through full spectrum dominance and unmatched tactical 
mobility (including vertical maneuver), 
• Lethal – enabled by superior information and communication, distributed 
fires networks, high operational tempo through force cycling, and 
proficiency at urban operations, 
• Survivable – achieved by retaining the tactical initiative and through 
technologies providing “low observability, reduced electronic signature, 
ballistic protection, long-range acquisition, early discrete targeting, shoot 
first every time, and target destruction” on every shot, and 
• Sustainable – through reduced “logistics footprint and replenishment 
demand,” performance-based logistics, and multi-modal distribution. [Ref. 
49, pp. 9-15]  
Sixth, the Objective Force concept is heavily reliant on the development of 
technological and procedural advancements in the realms of space-based capabilities and 
logistics efficiency.  Both of these concepts relate to the transformational effects of 
evolving information technology and communications technology, enabling the total 
asset visibility that is essential for predictive, high-speed sustainment.  They also 
contribute to Objective Force agility, lethality, information connectivity, and the efficient 
use of the nation’s capable but limited strategic lift assets. [Ref. 49, pp. 15-17] 
Finally, the Objective Force will be centered on an Army of highly skilled, highly 
motivated, and well-equipped soldiers.  These soldiers must have the knowledge, 
training, and stamina to transition between and execute a variety of missions with a much 
higher degree of autonomy than at present, made possible by “full-spectrum training” and 
a “knowledge-based battle command” network.  They must also adopt a universal new 
“Warrior culture” that overcomes the Army’s traditional heavy force and light force 
cultures and applies what were formerly special operations techniques to all maneuver 
operations. [Ref. 49, pp. 19-20] 
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C. OBJECTIVE FORCE AVIATION MISSIONS 
Stated mainly in terms of the Army’s primary ground-based operational focus, the 
Objective Force White Paper nonetheless contains tremendous implications for Army 
Aviation.  It advocates a ground force able to conduct tactical vertical envelopment, and 
“optimized for decentralized, non-contiguous operations.” [Ref. 49, pp. 11-12]   This 
implies two primary roles for general aviation forces: maneuver support for vertical 
maneuver, positioning ground mounted and dismounted forces at tactical and operational 
positions of advantage, and maneuver sustainment, providing critical supplies to 
maneuver forces over extended distances or across unsecured ground lines of 
communication (LOCs)2.  Both of these tasks establish a continuing role for utility 
helicopters in the Objective Force, and in fact suggest a possible need for more robust 
aviation organizations than are presently resourced. 
The Objective Force Aviation Concept of Operation describes six tasks for Army 
Aviation in support of the Objective Force:  reconnaissance, security, mobile strike, 
vertical maneuver, close combat with ground forces, and maneuver sustainment support. 
[Ref. 43, pp. 7-10]  Of these six, four are purely combat tasks; only vertical maneuver 
and maneuver sustainment support include general aviation components.   
Objective Force literature also contains scattered references to aviation tasks in 
the areas of command and control (providing aerial command and control platforms, such 
as the Army Airborne Command and Control System (A2C2S)), maneuver support 
(emplacing counter-mobility minefields and other obstacles, similar in concept to the 
UH-60-mounted M139 Volcano), and combat search and rescue (CSAR). 
 
1. Vertical Maneuver 
In describing the idea of vertical maneuver, the Objective Force White Paper 
states: 
                                                 
2 Defined as “A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating 
military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces 
move.” [Ref. 48] 
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Objective Forces will possess the organic capability to conduct tactical 
vertical envelopment and air assault in both independent actions and as 
complementary maneuver in support of committed ground forces. 
Executed rapidly, vertical maneuver provides positional advantage, 
achieves surprise, overcomes difficult terrain, exposes enemy capabilities 
to destruction throughout the JOA [Joint Operational Area], and blocks, 
isolates, or otherwise dislocates enemy forces. [Ref. 49, p. iv] 
The white paper identifies “vertical envelopment” and “air assault” as distinct 
tactical maneuvers.  This implies that the well-established concept of air assault, 
validated by the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) in 1963 [Ref. 30, p. 10], does not 
encompass the new concept of vertical maneuver.  So the question remains: what does 
vertical maneuver comprise? 
To bolster the Objective Force White Paper’s somewhat weak implication that 
Objective Force units will be capable of both mounted and dismounted vertical maneuver 
[Ref. 49, pp. 11-12], the Objective Force Aviation Concept of Operation asserts clearly 
that “Vertical maneuver consists of air assault of dismounted infantry, along with 
selected equipment from their future combat system (FCS), and the air movement of 
mounted forces.” [Ref. 43, p. 9] 
This definition classifies air assault and air movement as subsets of vertical 
maneuver.  The connotation in the Aviation Concept is that the riskier air assault mission 
is generally reserved for dismounted forces, while air movement operations will normally 
suffice for mounted forces.  It goes on to say that the role of aviation in vertical maneuver 
operations is to provide aircraft for lift, combat escort, and reconnaissance, and that 
additional elements of vertical maneuver include non-line-of-sight communications, a 
shared air/ground common situational picture, dynamic sensor tasking, advanced target 
detection, synchronized air/ground fires and effects, aerial re-supply until ground link up 
occurs, battle command on the move, and suppression of enemy air defenses. [Ref. 43, p. 
9] 
Among its conclusions, the March 14, 2003 draft report of the Army’s Air-
Ground Concept Exploration Program (CEP) confirmed that “the FCS is an incomplete 
family of systems without the capability to rapidly maneuver across all types of terrain at 
 29
all operational distances. Without mounted vertical envelopment at operational depth – 
specifically a capability to lift FCS vehicles – the Objective Force cannot assure 
dominant maneuver.” [Ref. 27, p. 5-1]   Consequently, it can be inferred that mounted 
vertical maneuver in the context of the Army Objective Force comprises the aerial 
transport of combat-configured FCS vehicles through enemy airspace to and from 
unimproved landing zones under the Army’s standard of high altitude (4000 feet), hot 
(95° Fahrenheit) conditions, in order to achieve tactical advantage on the battlefield. 
The Air-Ground CEP recommended that the Army procure a new development 
aviation system to meet the operational need for Objective Force vertical maneuver.  
Specifically, the CEP’s analysis indicated that the Air Mobility Transport – Tilt Rotor 
(AMT-T), presently in early development, would best fit the Objective Force’s lift 
requirements in support of vertical maneuver. [Ref. 27, p. A-1-1]   With a 20 ton payload 
and a 500-1000 kilometer mission radius (depending on whether the initial take-off is 
vertical or rolling), the AMT-T would accommodate Objective Force C4ISR 
interoperability requirements, and includes advanced infra-red signature reduction and 
reduced acoustic signature compared to a comparable fixed-rotor helicopter. [Ref. 27, p. 
A-1-2] 
The AMT-T, though, while it might be capable of air assault operations, would 
probably not be ideally suited for them, due to its projected larger signature and LZ size 
requirements.  Air assault operations pose a somewhat different situation than air 
movement.  In air assault operations, “assault forces (combat, combat support, and 
combat service support), using the firepower, mobility, and total integration of helicopter 
assets, maneuver on the battlefield under the control of the ground or air maneuver 
commander to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain.” [Ref. 
37, para. 1-2]   They may involve inserting air assault forces into comparatively small, 
hostile landing zones in close proximity to enemy forces.  Air movement operations, on 
the other hand, are transportation operations, and do not involve task organization of the 
ground maneuver element and the air delivery element under a single headquarters.  
Often, a mission is characterized as an air movement, and not given the more detailed 
planning required for an air assault, because it is not expected to involve immediate 
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combat at the actual point of insertion.  The AMT-T, with its inherently larger size and 
the burden of the FCS it would carry, would probably be required to land in order to 
discharge its load, thereby presenting itself as an exceptionally vulnerable target during 
an air assault involving immediate enemy contact. 
The basic tasks of the air assault and air movement missions may not change 
dramatically in the Objective Force; however, some of the conditions will.  Objective 
Force operations require, at maximum, that a UA  “be able to make a 400 km operational 
move by ground and fight for 72 hours without re-supply.” [Ref. 44, p. 4-19]   Since the 
Army expects that vertical maneuver in general “will normally be most effective when it 
is supported by the rapid advance of ground-mobile forces to reduce risk, reinforce, 
expand/exploit the results of the air-based maneuver, and keep the adversary from 
isolating the air-delivered force,” [Ref. 45, p. 30] it can be deduced that the practical 
upper distance limit for Objective Force operational and tactical vertical maneuver 
operations will be approximately 400 kilometers.  At the UA level, though, most air 
assaults are likely to take place within the limits of the UA’s 75-kilometer area of 
influence. [Ref. 44, p. 4-9]  Dismounted Objective Force air assault forces will 
experience many of the same limitations as current light forces, including limited ground 
mobility once inserted and reduced survivability compared to mounted forces.  
Additionally, Objective Force air assaults will be conducted at the expense of the unit’s 
unused FCS systems, which will stand idle until the air assault is complete.   
In addition to moving dismounted troops to the air assault objective, Objective 
Force aircraft will be required to transport several major pieces of equipment.  Objective 
Force infantry battalions will leave their FCS manned vehicles behind, but are expected 
to be equipped on air assaults with the Armed Robotic Vehicle – Assault (Light) (ARV-
A(L)), Multi-function Utility/Logistics and Equipment Vehicle (MULE), and Non-Line 
of Sight - Launch System (NLOS-LS). [Ref. 44, p. 6-6]  In fact, the FCS Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD) specifically states that “All FCS UMS must be capable 
of being carried during AASLT/air mobile by UH-60 and/or CH-47 helicopters in a high 
altitude, (4,000 foot pressure altitude), hot temperature (95 degrees F.) scenario for a 
radius of at least 75-150 km. The vehicle operators/crew will travel inside the helicopter 
 31
and will be considered as part of the helicopter cargo.” [Ref. 34, p. E-3]  This 
requirement agrees with the operational distances derived above, but does not provide a 
great deal of fidelity upon which to base the expected weights of the three systems under 
consideration, especially since the ORD also describes the Black Hawk as capable of 
“external lift in high/hot conditions is 4,500 lbs (threshold) and 10,000 lbs (objective).” 
[Ref. 34, p. G-3]  The U. S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) Army 
Future Combat Systems Unit of Action Systems Book (version 1.6), however, does list 
weights for the ARV-A(L), MULE, and NLOS-LS.3  The ARV-A(L) and MULE, both 
based on the same chassis, are projected to weigh 2.5 tons (5,000 lbs), while the NLOS-
LS is estimated at 1.4 tons (2,800 lbs). [Ref. 40, pp. 3-16 & 3-18] 
In addition to potentially greater operational requirements, Objective Force 
aviation will be expected to overcome a more capable air defense threat than it has in the 
past.  In Objective Force scenarios, threat experts have determined that “air defense 
ambushes and the innovative use of air defense weapons with passive acquisition and 
tracking systems (e.g., MANPADS [man-portable air defense systems], anti-helicopter 
mines, light AAA [anti-aircraft artillery]) may be encountered anywhere on the 
battlefield.  This can place both manned and unmanned aircraft at greater risk than in 
previous contingencies.  Aviation assets represent the type of targets an opponent, 
exercising asymmetric tactics, would seek to attack to demonstrate there is no sanctuary.” 
[Ref. 43, p. 12]  Consequently, Objective Force aircraft will require more advanced 
survivability characteristics, similar to the survivability of the FCS, if they are to operate 
on the future battlefield at all, let alone in an air assault role. 
 
2. Maneuver Sustainment 
Maneuver sustainment, the Objective Force incarnation of combat service 
support, comprises all of the assets, capabilities, and actions required to supply, maintain, 
man, and service maneuver units as they conduct operations.  Maneuver sustainment 
                                                 
3 The AMSAA weight references used in this study represent gross magnitudes only. 
The FCS systems’ physical parameters (weight, dimensions) that were included in 
version 1.6 have been removed in version 3.0, indicating that they are subject to change. 
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operations present tantalizing possibilities for fulfilling the tremendous potential of 
aviation in the Objective Force.  Repeated throughout Objective Force literature is the 
notion that “the maneuver sustainment operational environment will often be 
characterized by discontinuous, temporarily established LOCs; and aerial sustainment 
will be required in greater degree to support Objective Force mobility and agility.” [Ref. 
46, p. 5] 
Regarding the role of aviation in sustaining maneuver, the Objective Force 
Aviation Concept asserts: 
Objective Force operations will be sustained through distributed, 
transportation-based, globally-networked, and reach-back supported 
logistics capabilities without reliance on traditional and/or fixed 
intermediate staging bases (ISBs).  This will of necessity place greater 
reliance on aerial distribution platforms as a means of providing 
responsive and agile support from multiple locations within the theater. 
[Ref. 43, p. 9] 
The Aviation Concept also lists sustainment-focused capabilities that will be 
required of Objective Force aviation.  These fall mainly into two broad categories: 
support for critical, time-sensitive supply and evacuation, and sustainment support over 
long or broken ground LOCs. [Ref. 43, p. 10] 
The first category of requirements, for critical sustainment, includes medical 
evacuation and supply, and resupply of ammunition, fuel, and repair parts.  These events 
are likely to occur throughout a campaign, becoming more frequent during times of 
heavy maneuver engagement due to increases in casualty rates, battle damage, and fuel 
and ammunition consumption.   
Aerial sustainment over unsecured ground LOCs, on the other hand, includes a 
broader and deeper array of sustainment functions than critical sustainment.  It is likely to 
occur during the early stages of a campaign, while enemy forces are still able to employ 
anti-access measures against theater-level ground sustainment forces.  “Because of the 
inability to rely on fixed airports and seaports, aviation will play a major role in resupply 
and evacuation, and movement of supplies and personnel to deployed units.” [Ref. 43, p. 
17] 
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Aerial sustainment is also likely to be important when ground maneuver forces 
are employed in a non-contiguous manner, without secured ground LOCs, even after the 
initial stages of a campaign.  Scenarios under which this might occur include vertical 
maneuver of either mounted or dismounted forces, or penetrating ground maneuvers such 
as turning movements, encirclements, or envelopments.  Objective Force UAs are much 
more capable of these types of maneuvers than current forces, and thereby present 
opportunities to improve sustainment efficiency, survivability, and economy of security 
forces through the use of aerial sustainment. 
In an independent analysis of the Army’s Objective Force sustainment 
requirements, Maj. Jason R. Vick concluded that: 
A logical solution to the challenges of Objective Force sustainment 
is to develop an aerial-based sustainment and distribution system.  
Sustaining from the air supports vertical envelopment and offers the 
ability to rapidly sustain Objective Force units as they maneuver across 
long distances.  Such a system allows greater responsiveness, agility and 
survivability while increasing CSS [i.e., logistics] reach.  It will also 
increase logistic velocity, provide for execution of time definite deliveries 
and reduce the logistics footprint in the battlespace.  Finally, given the 
proper aerial vehicles, an aerial-based sustainment system could reduce 
theater distribution infrastructure requirements while improving capacity 
and control.  Given the expected operational environment, the Army 
cannot successfully execute its Objective Force transformation without an 
operational level aerial-based sustainment and distribution system. [Ref. 
55, p. 47] 
Like air assault, the conditions under which maneuver sustainment occurs in 
Objective Force operations are likely to be much different than those currently in effect.  
Changes to the operational conditions for maneuver sustainment will include a U.S. force 
that is more widely dispersed.  A key example of this is the previously mentioned UA 
target of a 75-kilometer area of influence – a much wider force footprint than today’s 
conventional forces occupy.  Another example is the Objective Force requirement to be 
prepared to move up to 400 kilometers from unimproved access points in order to initiate 
operations – 400 kilometers is a nearly impossible mission radius for a UH-60L even 
with no cargo whatsoever.  In addition, the Objective Force principle of non-contiguous 
operations presents new challenges for maintaining tactical security in what would 
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formerly have been considered rear area operations.  Enemy forces that are bypassed or 
otherwise not subdued could prove highly successful at interdicting traditional ground 
LOCs and air LOCs alike.  Recent anti-aviation ambushes in Operation Iraqi Freedom 
highlight the vulnerability of current U.S. aircraft to MANPADS of all types, especially 
on lightly secured but regularly traveled air routes.  
Unlike air assault, the basic nature of the maneuver sustainment mission will also 
change dramatically under Objective Force doctrine.  According to the Objective Force 
Maneuver Sustainment Concept: 
Operations will be effectively and efficiently sustained through 
distributed, transportation-based, globally networked, and reach-back 
supported logistics capabilities.  The theater sustainment concept 
envisions a combination of “direct from CONUS" and theater-centric 
support structures.  Surface transportation or fixed / rotary-wing lift 
aircraft will deliver materiel and service support in mission configured 
loads directly to forces in the objective area.  Supply systems must be 
interoperable to facilitate the strategic-national and theater lines of 
communication (LOC) segments supporting global distribution thereby 
reducing unnecessary duplication.  Because local shore logistic facilities 
may well be threatened or denied, temporary operating bases and sea-
based logistics will be used. [Ref. 46, p. 9-10] 
The concept of distribution-based logistics, supplanting the current practice of 
inventory-based logistics, will require an entirely new approach to the problem of 
sustainment.  This approach will rely on a comprehensive common logistical picture that 
tracks every item of supply at all levels, and on a highly mobile and responsive 
distribution system including multiple modes of transportation.   
Helicopter-based delivery, while likely to play a prominent role in the new 
logistics concept, is not the only available method of air transport even at the tactical 
level.  “Short take-off / landing aircraft, precision guided parafoils, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, and airdrop” are all valid alternative methods fulfilling the principle of aerial 
sustainment.  Regardless of the efficacy of these methods, though, utility helicopters will 
play an important role in sustaining Objective Force maneuver.  To do so effectively, 
they must be both capable of carrying Objective Force loads over Objective Force 
distances, and survivable against the growing ground-based threats discussed earlier.   
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 D. CONSEQUENCES FOR UTILITY LIFT 
In separating the Objective Force requirements for utility lift from those for cargo 
and heavy lift, it is important to first understand the definitions of the different lift 
categories.  The U.S. Joint Doctrine Division’s Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military Terms defines a utility helicopter as a “multi-purpose helicopter capable of 
lifting troops but may be used in a command and control, logistics, casualty evacuation or 
armed helicopter role,” [Ref. 48] but fails to define cargo helicopters or heavy lift 
helicopters.  It does define heavy-lift cargo, although in Navy/Marine Corps terms, as “1. 
Any single cargo lift, weighing over 5 long tons, and to be handled aboard ship, or 2. In 
Marine Corps usage, individual units of cargo that exceed 800 pounds in weight or 100 
cubic feet in volume.”  [Ref. 48]  
Army Field Manual 1-113, while not specifically defining the difference between 
lift categories, points out differences in the way utility and cargo helicopters are 
employed.  Specifically, “the AHB [Assault Helicopter Battalion, consisting of 30 UH-
60s] provides division and corps commanders with a highly mobile, flexible, and 
responsive combat force. This force can plan and execute combat, combat support and 
combat service support operations. The AHB's speed and mobility enable the commander 
to adjust force ratios across the entire battlefield, carrying the fight to the enemy.”  
Simultaneously, heavy helicopter battalions, consisting of 32 CH-47s located at Corps-
level echelons, “provide the force commander a highly mobile and rapid means of 
moving priority combat systems, personnel, and supplies throughout his AO. 
Additionally, the heavy helicopter battalion, coupled with AHBs, provides the force 
commander with a robust air assault force capable of moving large numbers of combat 
soldiers great distances.” [Ref. 36, para. 1-3] 
These differences in employment are based on differences in capabilities and 
limitations.  In general, higher lift ratings are accompanied by higher operating costs, 
greater fuel consumption, slower speed, shorter flight endurance, larger threat signature, 
and greater gross weight.  These characteristics make it economically and tactically more 
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efficient to use utility helicopters (i.e., Black Hawks) for missions involving smaller 
payloads, particularly troop and casualty transport. 
 
E. UTILITY HELICOPTER MISSIONS 
The current FCS ORD describes Objective Force missions for both the UH-60 
and the CH-47.  For the UH-60, it says: “The UH-60 Black Hawk will provide lift, 
command and control, and logistical support to units in the FCS-equipped UA Force. It 
will operationally and tactically move forces throughout the battlespace to achieve full 
spectrum dominance.” [Ref. 34, p. G-3]  For the CH-47, it states: “The CH-47 Chinook is 
designed to transport ground forces, supplies, ammunition and other battle-critical cargo 
in support of worldwide combat and contingency operations.” [Ref. 34, p. G-3]  
Excepting the reference to command and control, these are essentially variations on the 
same mission, reaffirming the traditional role of the UH-60 as a forward area utility 
packhorse and the CH-47 as a rear echelon cargo wagon.   
In addition to sustainment support, the Black Hawk is expected to support 
Objective Force air assault operations.  According to the UA Organizational and 
Operational Concept, the UA must have the capability to “conduct air assault operations 
by a dismounted unit with manned or unmanned mission equipment packages 
dismounted from their platforms; enables ability for overmatching combat power until 
linkup can be accomplished.” [Ref. 44, p. 6-5]  Furthermore, as discussed previously, 
“this must include the capability to airlift MULE, ARV-A(L), and NLOS-LS systems via  
UH-60 aircraft, and ARV (A) [Armed Robotic Vehicle (Assault)] and ARV (RSTA) 
[Armed Robotic Vehicle (Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition)] via CH-
47.” [Ref. 44, p. 6-6] 
To summarize, then, the Black Hawk must be capable of two basic missions in 
support of the Objective Force.  It must provide sustainment transport suited to its 
capabilities (i.e., moderate loads, relatively forward), and it must provide lift for 
battalion-size and smaller dismounted air assault and air movement.  These will typically 
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be conducted over distances of approximately 75 to 150 kilometers, but could extend for 
up to 400 kilometers during initial entry operations. 
 
F. OBJECTIVE FORCE UTILITY LIFT REQUIREMENTS 
Classifying the Black Hawk as the Army’s utility lift helicopter for the first 
increments, at least, of the Objective Force, it is possible to derive a number of specific 
requirements for Objective Force utility.  These can be further divided into specified and 
implied requirements.  Specified requirements are those in which Objective Force 
literature specifically names the Black Hawk or utility helicopters as performing a 
particular task or possessing a particular attribute.  Implied requirements are those 
derived tangentially from Objective Force concepts and requirements for other systems, 
especially the FCS.   
References for specified utility lift requirements are shown in Table 9 at 
Appendix A.  They specifically require only that the Black Hawk (1) provide lift, 
command and control, and logistical support to the Objective Force, (2) display the same 
common operational picture as Objective Force units, and (3) lift the 2.5 ton ARV-A(L), 
2.5 ton MULE, and 1.4 ton NLOS-LS under high/hot conditions for a radius of at least 75 
to 150 kilometers.  The FCS ORD appears to assume that the CH-47 will be required to 
lift the Armed Robotic Vehicle – Assault (ARV-A) and Armed Robotic Vehicle – 
Reconnaissance/Surveillance/Target Acquisition (ARV-RSTA) unmanned system 
variants. [Ref. 34, p. E-2-A-2]  However, full combat weight for the ARV-A and ARV-
RSTA are projected at 10,000 pounds each [Ref. 40, p. 3-42] – a weight that is 
marginally within the UH-60X objective lift requirement.  Fielding of the ARV-A and 
ARV-RSTA is additionally planned for deferral until supporting technology matures.  
Consequently, these platforms should be considered as potential utility helicopter loads. 
The FCS ORD also specifies a requirement for the CH-47 to sling-load the Class 
IV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), which is projected to have a gross weight of 4000 
pounds. [Ref. 40, p. 3-57]  For tactical distances (less than 200 kilometers) or under 
benign conditions (less than high/hot), the UH-60L is already capable of handling this 
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load.  The UH-60M could also lift 4000 pounds for distances of less than 100 kilometers.  
The Class IV UAV should therefore also be considered a potential utility helicopter load. 
In addition to specified requirements, Objective Force concepts yield a number of 
implied requirements for utility lift systems.  These requirements, summarized below, are 
also detailed in Tables 10 through 14 at Appendix A, organized according to the subject 
headings of responsiveness and deployability, agility and versatility, survivability and 
lethality, sustainability, and information and interoperability. 
Objective Force responsiveness and deployability requirements for utility 
helicopters include an extended employment radius of 475 kilometers, world-wide self-
deployment, full-spectrum operability in any environment, automated loading/unloading, 
precision maneuver, cognitive crew aids, command post suitability, and organizational 
support for force cycling. 
Survivability and lethality requirements include signature reduction, low 
observability, situational awareness, threat warning, active countermeasures, 
chemical/biological/radiological/electromagnetic survivability, obstacle avoidance, 
weapons effects survivability, accident effects minimization, NLOS effects direction, 
dash speed, and directed energy/radio frequency survivability. 
Sustainability requirements include reduced maintenance and supply demand, 
increased reliability and availability, embedded readiness monitoring, component and 
tools standardization, expert ground diagnostics, two-level maintenance support, and 
graceful degradation when components fail. 
Information and interoperability requirements include integrated mission planning 
and rehearsal systems, battle command network integration, LOS and NLOS 
communications, fast data transmission, communications interoperability, networked 
training systems, and combat identification. 
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G. UNFULFILLED UH-60 HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS 
The Operational Requirements Document (ORD) for Recapitalization of the UH-
60 Black Hawk Utility Helicopter Fleet, prepared in March 2001 by the Directorate of 
Combat Developments at Fort Rucker, Alabama, identifies several shortcomings of the 
existing UH-60A/L helicopter.  The analysis that follows in Section H of this chapter 
(comparing current UH-60 requirements to Objective Force utility helicopter 
requirements) considers not only these shortcomings but all of the requirements stated in 
the UH-60 ORD.  However, describing the shortcomings provides a convenient way to 
summarize the current force utility lift requirements that have not been met by the L-
model UH-60 helicopter, which is presently in production.  The UH-60L’s shortcomings 
include: 
 
1. Lift Capability 
The Army has identified the need for a utility helicopter with a 9,000 pound 
external lift capability.  Helicopter performance is degraded at higher altitudes and hotter 
temperatures.  On a relatively cool day (75 degrees Fahrenheit) at sea-level, the current 
UH-60L has the capability to externally lift 9,000 pounds over short distances.  The 
ORD, however, identifies the requirement to externally lift 9,000 pounds over a combat 
radius of 73 nautical miles at pressure altitudes of 4,000 feet and temperatures of 95 
degrees Fahrenheit.  The criteria of 4,000 feet pressure altitude and 95 degrees is an 
accepted standard for the high/hot environments in which the Army must be able operate.  
Under those environmental conditions, the current UH-60L can externally lift only 6,000 
pounds in a basic mission configuration.  “The aircraft is presently not capable of 
transporting numerous current and projected weapon systems, e.g. HMMWV family, 
Avenger, the artillery’s lightweight 155mm howitzer (LW155) and light forces’ direct 
support artillery as a complete mission package, and Line of Sight-Anti Tank (LOSAT).  
This is especially so in high density altitude (DA) environments such as Southwest Asia.” 
[Ref. 38, pp. 13-14] 
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2. Interoperability  
“The UH-60A/L Black Hawk does not have the necessary digital avionics 
architecture to meet current and future Army and Joint Vision 2010/20 communications 
interoperability and information exchange requirements.” The current Black Hawk, 
except in the specialized A2C2S configuration, is not able to integrate either current or 
future digital command and control systems that will link it to the Objective Force battle 
command network, nor does it have the architecture to support the Army’s next 
generation radio systems.  In particular, the system does not have a digital bus, required 
to integrate digital radios to digital command and control components.  In addition, 
“power fluctuations and increased load requirements” in the current power system make 
the UH-60 further unable to support future avionics and survivability equipment 
improvements.  Finally, the UH-60’s current communication and navigation suites have 
not been certified as meeting the latest International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic management requirements, and are 
likely to require upgrades in order to comply. [Ref. 38, p. 14] 
 
3. Flight Handling Characteristics  
Navigation and flight control systems do not allow the UH-60 to conduct 
precision troop insertion in a degraded visual environment (DVE) such as extreme 
darkness or reduced visibility due to weather, blowing dust, or snow.  Army Regulation 
(AR) 95-1, Flight Regulations, specifies minimum safe weather conditions for operation 
of current U.S. Army aircraft.  AR 95-1 prohibits daytime rotary-wing operations if the 
visibility is less than one-half mile.  Nighttime rotary wing operations are prohibited if 
visibility is less than 1 mile.  In order to increase the margin of safety, many Army 
installation and division commanders have imposed more restrictive environmental 
limitations on helicopter operations.  The 101st Airborne Division, which specializes in 
helicopter troop and equipment insertion operations, also specifies minimum ceilings of 
300 feet for daytime operations and 500 feet for nighttime operations in addition to the 
visibility restrictions in Army Regulation 95-1. [Ref. 39] 
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The ORD specifies threshold requirements to minimize pilot workload in all 
phases of flight and all mission configurations.  “The aircraft must maintain a position 
over the ground within 15 feet and hover altitude within 8 feet for altitudes up to 50 feet 
above ground level (AGL) for 4 minutes in winds up to 25 knots with a gust spread up to 
10 knots”.  The ORD further states that “Current and future combat operations require 
day and night, adverse weather, precision (land and over-water) navigational accuracy for 
the aerial assault of troops and equipment, resupply, special operations, medical 
evacuation, noncombatant operations, and worldwide deployability” and, “The UH-60 
helicopter . . . must be capable of operating from unimproved land surfaces and seaborne 
facilities, day or night, and in adverse weather (battlefield conditions less than visual 
meteorological conditions) including moderate icing.” [Ref. 38] 
 
4. Survivability 
“Aircraft survivability equipment (ASE) suites do not provide sufficient 
capability to counter current and future advanced threat anti-aircraft weapon systems.” 
[Ref. 38, p. 14]  The current UH-60A/L aircraft are equipped with multiple survivability 
countermeasures designed to mitigate the risk of anti-aircraft weapons and missiles.  The 
aircraft has countermeasures to protect against infra-red (IR) missiles (commonly called 
heat-seeking missiles), radar guided missiles or air defense artillery (ADA), and small 
arms fire.   
To protect against the threat of IR missiles, the aircraft is equipped with the 
AN/ALQ-144 infra-red countermeasures device, which emits an IR signal designed to 
jam incoming IR missiles and confuse their internal IR missile guidance system.  This is 
an active device that operates continuously when turned on.  The primary heat source on 
the aircraft, which incoming IR missiles target, is the engine exhaust.  To reduce the IR 
signature of the aircraft engines, the UH-60 is equipped with the Hover Infrared 
Suppression Subsystem (HIRSS).   
The hover IR suppressor provides improved helicopter 
survivability from heat-seeking missiles throughout the flight envelope. 
The HIRSS kit has no moving parts. It contains a three-stage removable 
core which reduces metal surface and exhaust gas temperature radiation 
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and prevents line-of-sight viewing of hot engine surfaces. The HIRSS 
channels hot exhaust gasses through the three-stage core and inner baffle 
to induce the flow of cooling air from the engine bay and the inlet scoops. 
The three-stage core and inner baffle cold surfaces are coated with low 
reflectance material. For further cooling, hot exhaust gas is ducted o 
outboard and downward by the engine, away from the helicopter by the 
exhaust deflector, where additional cooling air is provided by the main 
rotor downwash. [Ref. 8, pp. 2-36] 
Also, to reduce the IR signature, the aircraft is painted with low reflective paint to 
reduce IR signature caused by reflected sunlight. 
To protect against the threat of radar guided ADA weapons, the aircraft is 
equipped with the AN/APR-39 radar detector.  This is a passive sensor that, when turned 
on, detects radar signal that may be tracking the aircraft and alerts the pilot to the signal’s 
direction, intensity, and potential source.  The aircraft is also equipped with the M-130 
chaff dispenser system that, when fired by the pilot, deploys a cloud of chaff--small metal 
flakes that float in the air--which are designed to temporarily diffuse threat radar 
guidance systems and allow the pilot to conduct evasive maneuver to avoid radar guided 
missiles or ADA weapons systems. 
The aircraft with the Kevlar blanket installed in the floor of the cabin provides the 
crew and passengers ballistic protection against 7.62mm ground-fired armor-piercing 
projectiles.  The internal fuel cells are self-sealing when penetrated by fully tumbled 
7.62mm projectiles.  The external fuel cells offer no ballistic protection from small arms 
fire.   
The ORD specifies threshold requirements for aircraft survivability equipment to 
maintain at least the UH-60L IR signature and active and passive countermeasures.  Also 
the aircraft must employ a balance of signature reduction, passive countermeasures, and 
active countermeasures to protect against detection and engagement by threat radar and 
laser weapon systems.  The current aircraft, however, fails to meet the objective 
requirements specified in the ORD.  Objective requirements are reduced acoustic and 
radar cross section signatures, integration of passive and active countermeasure suites 
with the aircraft’s tactical displays, and improved ballistic protection for the crew and the 
internal fuel cells to 14.5mm. 
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 5. Operating Costs and Reliability  
The UH-60 was originally designed with a service life of 20 years. [Ref. 2]  The 
fleet will begin reaching its 20-year service life goal in 2007.  As the fleet ages, the 
annual cost per flying hour is beginning to increase above budgeted levels.  A dedicated 
recapitalization plan is needed in order for the UH-60 fleet to meet availability, 
maintainability, and affordability goals.  Current cost per flying hour of the UH-60A is 
$2,304, and current cost per flying hour for the UH-60L is $1,802.  The Department of 
the Army goal for UH-60 readiness is 80%.  Currently, during Operation Enduring 
Freedom, the Army’s UH-60 fleet is maintaining only a 60-65% mission capable rate.  
The ORD specifies a threshold requirement for mean time between misson-affecting 
failure of 18 flight hours (21 flight hours is the objective) and a threshold requirement for 
mean time between essential maintenance of 4.5 flight hours (5.2 flight hours is the 
objective). 
 
H. OBJECTIVE FORCE AND UH-60 REQUIREMENTS COMPARED 
In order to focus development of the UH-60 to fulfill the utility lift requirements 
of the Objective Force in the future operational environment, it is important to compare 
the Objective Force’s requirements for utility lift to known Black Hawk helicopter 
shortcomings documented in the UH-60 ORD.  This will also facilitate discovering 
previously unknown actual or potential shortfalls of the current development plan.  Each 
of these two requirements perspectives has been described in detail in the preceding 
sections of this chapter.  This section is dedicated to comparing them, and to deriving 
information that may, when analyzed in conjunction with technical, schedule, and cost 
data, help guide future development efforts for the Black Hawk program. 
Discrepancies between Objective Force and Black Hawk requirements are 
discussed below.  Specified Objective Force utility lift requirements are addressed first.  
Then implied requirements are examined, following the five subject areas used 
 44
previously: responsiveness and deployability, agility and versatility, survivability and 
lethality, sustainability, and information and interoperability: 
 
1. Specified Requirements  
Objective Force specified requirements boil down to a need for utility aircraft to 
integrate into the Objective Force common operating picture, and to transport the ARV-
A(L), MULE, and NLOS-LS, weighing at most 5,000 pounds, for 150 kilometers in 
high/hot conditions, with operators.  The term “operators” is not well defined, though, 
since neither the ARV-A (L) nor the MULE has a designated operator, and could range 
from one person weighing approximately 290 pounds [Ref. 34, p. G-3] to an 11-man 
squad weighing 3,200 pounds.  Assuming that the most efficient lift would include one of 
the infantry squads that the unmanned vehicle supports, allowing an infantry platoon to 
air assault via only four aircraft, the maximum load requirement would equal 8,200 
pounds, or 9,000 pounds after adding a 10% error margin. 
 
2. Responsiveness and Deployability 
The UH-60 ORD specifies 4,500 pounds (Block I) and 9,000 pounds (Block II) of 
lift with a combat radius of 135 kilometers, and 10,000 pounds of lift with a 275-
kilometer combat radius (Objective).  Block II satisfies the Objective Force lift  
requirement identified above, but not the 475-kilometer distance requirement that 
Objective Force concept documents imply for initial entry.  In-air refueling would 
mitigate this deficiency.   
 
3. Agility and Versatility 
The UH-60 ORD identifies requirements or current design deficiencies for 
continuous operations, precision navigation, mission management, and airborne 
command posts.  The ORD does not identify a requirement for a rapid or automatic 
internal or external loading system, or address the Objective Force concept of robust unit 
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design to facilitate force cycling (although this is addressed in the Objective Force 
Aviation Concept). 
 
4. Survivability and Lethality 
The UH-60 ORD acknowledges survivability deficiencies in the UH-60A/L 
models, and requires specific improvements in crew protection, directed energy weapon 
countermeasures, chemical contamination protection, and onboard suppressive weapons.  
It also presents general requirements for signature reduction and defensive 
maneuverability, and an objective requirement for an infra-red optical imaging system to 
aid in navigation and obstacle detection.  However, the ORD does not address any sort of 




The UH-60 ORD acknowledges the planned Army two-level maintenance system, 
but does not project that the UH-60 can be properly maintained under such a system.  The 
ORD presents requirements for reducing the logistics footprint the system creates by 
increasing reliability (primarily through rebuilding airframes) and maintainability, 
integrating onboard diagnostics and prognostics, and use of the Global Combat Service 
Support automated logbook.  The ORD does not address expert ground maintenance 
systems or advanced embedded readiness systems. 
 
6. Information and Interoperability  
The UH-60 ORD mandates interoperability with the Air Mission Planning 
System, and an open systems architecture to accommodate future systems.  It also 
requires support for joint, military, and civilian communications including and objective 
requirement for satellite communications, as well as onboard integration of both current 
and future battle command systems and support for all critical top-level IERs (threshold) 
and all top-level IERs (objective), as well as support for basic interaction with interactive 
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training applications.  The ORD does not mention combat identification of friend, foe, or 
unknown entities. 
 
I. OBJECTIVE FORCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE UH-60 
Although the current UH-60 ORD pre-dates the definition of several Objective 
Force requirements, the requirements it contains are largely accurate in terms of meeting 
Objective Force needs.  In particular, the five current UH-60 shortfall categories 
described in Section G also offer a logical means of grouping the UH-60’s shortfalls in 
terms of Objective Force requirements: 
Lift capability is, as always, the most important consideration for the UH-60 in 
supporting the Objective Force.  This is why it is the only requirement that is spelled out 
in the FCS ORD.  The FCS ORD specifies that the UH-60 carry the ARV-A(L), MULE, 
and NLOS-LS, but as explained in Section H above this requirement translates to 
increasing the UH-60’s external lift capacity to approximately 9,000 pounds at 4000 feet 
pressure altitude and 95 degrees Fahrenheit, with an operating range of 150 kilometers 
under normal conditions and 475 kilometers under extraordinary conditions. 
Interoperability, a relatively new priority for the Army, is also critical in order to 
meet Objective Force needs.  The FCS Organizational and Operational Concept 
specifically calls for Objective Force utility rotorcraft to be equipped with the same 
common operating picture as ground forces, which means integration into the Objective 
Force battle command network.  However, integration into the Objective Force mission 
planning and rehearsal system, LOS and NLOS communications, fast data transmission, 
communications interoperability, networked training systems, and combat identification 
also fall under this requirement. 
Improved flight handling characteristics will allow the UH-60 to fulfill Objective 
Force requirements for full-spectrum operations, including conducting precision insertion 
of troops and equipment in conditions of darkness, adverse weather, and adverse 
environmental conditions.  Mission management systems, support for airborne command 
posts and automated loading systems are also included in this requirement. 
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Survivability, always important, will be become more critical and also more 
difficult under Objective Force doctrine.  Crew protection, directed energy weapon 
countermeasures, chemical contamination protection, onboard suppressive weapons, 
signature reduction, defensive maneuverability, obstacle detection, threat detection and 
response, and networked fires are all elements of this requirement. 
Supportability requirements, encompassing operating costs and reliability, are 
contained in the analysis of sustainability requirements in Section H above.  They include 
support for a two-level maintenance system, increased reliability and maintainability, 
onboard diagnostics and prognostics, expert ground maintenance systems, and advanced 
embedded readiness systems. 
 
J. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter sequentially explored the Objective Force’s operational and 
organizational concept, the Army Aviation and utility helicopter missions that arise from 
that concept, and the subsequent Objective Force requirements for utility lift helicopters.   
It also described the current state of UH-60 helicopter requirements in terms of 
requirements the aircraft has not yet met, and finally it compared Objective Force utility 
helicopter requirements to current UH-60 helicopter requirements, identifying Objective 
Force requirements that need to be addressed by the UH-60.   
The chapter concluded that, despite several relatively minor discrepancies, the 
current UH-60 ORD acknowledges Objective Force requirements and concepts, and 
attempts to answer them within the developmental constraints of the existing aircraft, by 
identifying shortfall within the five categories outlined in this chapter (lift capacity, 
interoperability, flight handling characteristics, survivability, and supportability).  This 
may not always be technically possible, however.  Chapter V addresses the technical 
feasibility of upgrading the UH-60 to meet Objective Force requirements.   
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE UH-60 UPGRADE PLAN 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter examines the planned and potential upgrades to the UH-60 fleet.  As 
indicated in Chapters I and II, the UH-60 fleet has evolved from the UH-60A to the UH-
60L to the UH-60M.  The next utility helicopter evolution could either be a non-
developmental item, a newly designed helicopter (the FUR), or it could be a further 
upgrade to the UH-60M known as the UH-60X.  This chapter focuses on the technical 
feasibility of developing the UH-60X to meet the Army’s requirements among five 
dimensions: lift capacity, interoperability, improved flight handling characteristics, 
survivability, and reliability. 
The conclusion of each sub-section considers risk, and classifies it as either high, 
medium, or low in terms of the technological goals according to the Utility Helicopter 
Project Management Office’s risk management definitions (Appendix B): 
The risk management process identifies a hierarchy of risks that 
may potentially impact the successful achievement of program goals, 
objectives, thresholds, and/or established program milestone exit criteria.  
For consistency throughout the program, the risk level definitions have 
been developed.  [Ref. 57, pp. 16-17) 
 
B. LIFT CAPACITY 
Requirement:  Increase external lift capacity to 9,000 pounds at 4,000 feet 
pressure altitude and 95 degrees Fahrenheit.   
In order for the UH-60 to meet this requirement, all elements of the drive train 
must be improved.  The helicopter drive train consists of the engines, the rotor system, 
and the transmission.  The lift capacity of the current UH-60 helicopter is limited by the 
power provided by its two engines.  As engine performance is increased, however, the 
aircraft transmission becomes the limiting factor.  If both the engine and the transmission 
are improved, the efficiency of the rotor system then becomes the limiting factor.  This 
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section first examines the planned upgrades to the engines, and then examines the 
potential upgrades to the transmission and rotor system. 
The Army’s Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) is a ten-year, $275 million 
program intended to develop a production engine that weighs the same as the UH-60L’s 
current engine (456 pounds), but produces 30 percent more shaft horsepower while 
consuming 25 percent less fuel. [Ref. 6] The technology has existed for years to produce 
an engine this powerful.  Turbine engines are essentially scalable, meaning that it is 
technically feasible to build a bigger engine with a similar thrust-to-weight ratio using a 
similar design.  In other words, all one has to do to get more power is to build a bigger 
engine.  The problem with today’s technology is that this more powerful engine would be 
larger and heavier.   
Similarly, the larger engine would require more fuel.  Engine fuel consumption is 
measured in terms of Specific Fuel Consumption (SFC), which is defined as fuel 
consumption in pounds per hour per shaft horsepower.  The ITEP goal is an engine with 
an SFC of .40 at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees, which represents a 25 percent improvement 
over the current engine. [Ref 6] 
ITEP’s goal to allow only 10 years to develop an engine with a 30 percent 
increase in power, and 25 percent decrease in fuel consumption, and no increase in 
engine weight is very aggressive.  Historical trends in turbine engine technology indicate 
that a longer research and development period would be more appropriate.  For example, 
the General Electric T-700 engine first went into production in 1978.  That engine 
produced 1,622 shaft horsepower at sea level, with an SFC of 0.467.  In 1989, General 
Electric began production of the T-700-701C engine.  The -701C produces 1,890 shaft 
horsepower at sea level with an SFC of 0.462.  In eleven years, General Electric was able 
to achieve only a 17 percent increase in horsepower with less than 1 percent reduction in 
SFC.  Also, the more powerful -701C engine was 5 percent heavier than the less powerful 
engine it replaced.  [Ref. 10] This trend would indicate that the ITEP goals might be 
overly aggressive. 
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Since 1989, however, there have been significant advances in turbine engine 
technology.  In 1988, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), and other leaders in the turbine engine industry launched a joint 
venture called the Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET) 
program.  The program established aggressive timelines to advance turbine engine 
technology with specific goals to increase shaft horsepower while decreasing specific 
fuel consumption. 
The IHPTET goals and timelines established three phases, each with its own 
performance improvement targets: 
• Phase I, to be complete in 1991, set targets of a 40 percent increase in 
horsepower/weight ratio, with a 20 percent reduction in specific fuel 
consumption.   
• Phase II, set to end in 1997, targeted an 80 percent higher horsepower to 
weight ratio with a 30 percent lower specific fuel consumption (relative to 
1988 technology).   
• Phase III was to be completed in 2003, with target goals of 120 percent 
increase in horsepower to weight ratio with a 40 percent reduction in 
specific fuel consumption. 
Currently, the IHPTET program has only demonstrated technology that can 
accomplish the Phase II goals (80 percent increase in horsepower/weight ratio and 30 
percent reduction in specific fuel consumption).  The primary improvements in 
technology that allowed these increases are improved materials and improved 
manufacturing techniques.  The improved materials allow the engine to run at hotter 
temperatures.  The improved manufacturing techniques provide closer tolerances for 
clearance in the compressor section of the engine.4   
Dr. Ray Shreeve, an expert in turbine and jet engines and a former professor at the 
jet propulsion laboratory at the Naval Postgraduate School, reviewed the current ITEP 
plan.  According to Dr. Shreeve, the accepted standard for progression from 
demonstrated technology to a production engine is 10 years.  This is in line with the 
program schedule estimates for the ITEP.  Also, according to Dr. Shreeve, it costs 
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4 Interview with Dr. Garth V. Hobson, Professor, Department of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics, Naval Postgraduate School, Oct. 14, 2003. 
roughly a quarter of a billion dollars in RDT&E to progress from demonstrated 
technology to a flight-tested engine ready for production.  This is in line with the program 
budget estimates.   
Dr. Shreeve concludes that the Army’s ITEP goals (30 percent more power with 
25 percent less fuel consumption) for the UH-60X engine are well within the 
demonstrated technology improvements of the IHPTET program and are technically 
feasible within ten years.  
 Improvements to the engine alone, however, will not allow the UH-60 to lift 
9,000 pounds.  In support of this project, Mr. John Davis, an engineer at the Aviation 
Engineering Directorate – Aeromechanics Division, performed a computer engineering 
assessment of the impact of putting a new, more powerful engine in the current UH-60L 
helicopter.  He showed that increasing the horsepower of the existing engines by 30 
percent, given the current aircraft transmission limits, would allow the aircraft to operate 
at gross weights up to 22,191 pounds at 4000 feet and 95 degrees.  This computer 
assessment indicates that improving the engine alone will result in a 7,691-pound 
external lift capacity.    
To achieve the ORD threshold of 9,000 pounds external lift, other performance 
upgrades will be required.  Once engine performance is improved, the next limiting 
factors would be the 1989 vintage aircraft transmission, drive shafts, and gearboxes.  
According to Mr. Davis, advances in manufacturing and materials would probably make 
it feasible to design new transmissions, drive shafts, and gearboxes that could be rated at 
the required horsepower without increasing the weight of the components.  This will not 
necessarily be without technical risk, and will require considerable time, effort, and 
expense to design, produce, and flight test these components.  From a program 
management standpoint, however, developing these components appears to have low 
technical risk given the current fielding schedule of the UH-60X.   
Mr. Davis performed another computer engineering simulation, using the current 
UH-60L configuration.  For this second simulation, he again used the 30 percent more 
powerful engines, but also assumed that the aircraft transmission was not a limiting 
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factor.  With the improved engine and transmission, the aircraft would be capable of 
lifting external loads up to 8,670 pounds at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees.  Mr. Davis 
concluded that achieving a lift capacity of 9,000 pounds by increasing engine power and 
transmission capability alone may not be technically feasible because the rotor system 
becomes increasingly inefficient at the higher loadings in this high/hot atmospheric 
condition.5 
To fully meet the Army’s requirement for 9,000 pounds external lift, further 
modifications to the UH-60 would be required.  Such modifications would include the 
previously noted upgrades to the engine and transmission, plus an increase in the 
diameter of the rotor system.  Using Sikorsky’s S-92 rotor system as a model, this would 
require lengthening the airframe to achieve clearance between the main and tail rotor.   
Lengthening the airframe adds significant technical risk.  The required airframe 
modifications would likely increase aircraft gross weight and would adversely affect the 
center of gravity of the aircraft by placing the tail rotor and tail rotor gearbox further aft 
of center.  This would require other airframe modifications to maintain proper center of 
gravity.  Also, making a significant change to the rotor system and the airframe may 
affect the natural frequency of the aircraft.  This, in turn, may increase vibration during 
certain modes of flight and require further airframe modifications to compensate.  The 
effects of lengthening the airframe are impossible to predict accurately without actual 
flight-testing data.6 
 Increasing external lift from 6,000 pounds to 7,600 pounds poses relatively little 
technical risk.  It appears to be technically feasible by developing a production engine 
with 30 percent more power than the existing engine.  Further increasing lift capacity to 
8,600 pounds is probably technically feasible by developing an improved transmission, 
drive shafts, and gearboxes and poses low technical risk.  Fully meeting the Army’s 
requirement for external lift capacity of 9,000 pounds may be technically feasible, but 
will require significant airframe modifications and high technical risk. 
                                                 
5 Source: Interview with Mr. John Davis, Nov. 14, 2003. 
6 Source: Interview with Dr. E Roberts Wood, Professor, Department of Aeronautics 
and Astronautics, Naval Postgraduate School, Sep. 11, 2003. 
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Table 1.   Technical Risk of Lift Capacity Upgrades 
Lift Capacity Required Upgrade Technical Risk 
6,000 pounds Current capacity None 
7,600 pounds Improved engine (ITEP) Low 
8,600 pounds Improved transmission, drive shafts, gear boxes Low 
9,000 pounds New rotor system, airframe modifications High 
 
C.   INTEROPERABILITY 
Requirement: Interoperability with the Army’s digital forces. 
The UH-60M (increment 1) essentially meets this requirement.  It includes the 
system architecture to support digital avionics and communication equipment, and is 
projected to be able to accept the Army’s new Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) when 
it is fielded.  The UH-60M (increment 2) is scheduled to be fielded with the JTRS already 
installed.  Because the UH-60M was specifically designed with open systems architecture 
and interoperability as a priority, meeting the Army’s requirement for interoperability 
appears to offer relatively low technical risk. 
 
D.   FLIGHT HANDLING CHARACTERISTICS 
Requirement:  Conduct precision insertion of troops and equipment in conditions 
of darkness, adverse weather, and adverse environmental conditions. 
 
1. Operation in Adverse Environments (Brown-Out) 
The primary technical problem in conducting helicopter operations in a degraded 
visual environment (DVE) is the inherent instability of the aircraft at low airspeeds.  
Without visual reference it is impossible for the pilot to properly determine the aircraft’s 
attitude with relation to the ground.  At low airspeeds the current aircraft instrumentation 
is insufficient to provide this visual reference.  Therefore, it is unsafe to operate the 
current configuration UH-60L at low airspeeds (i.e. hovering or landing) without a visual 
reference of the ground.   
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 Helicopter pilots have four means of control:  heading with pedal, 
altitude with the collective, pitch attitude and forward speed with fore/aft 
cyclic, and roll and sideward flight with lateral cyclic.  Actively 
controlling all four of these motions at the same time with no visual 
reference outside the cockpit is an extremely difficult task.  Pilot workload 
manipulating these four controls must be reduced to make low-visibility 
approach and hover a tactic available to the operational commander. [Ref. 
12, p. 1] 
The technology to overcome this limitation has existed for some time.  Coast 
Guard helicopters have had the ability to approach and land without outside visual 
reference for over 40 years. [Ref. 13]  They are equipped with a “hover indicator” 
display, which uses either on-board Doppler radar or global positioning system data to 
give the pilot drift information and drift velocity vectors.  The figure below shows a 
typical hover indicator.   
Figure 3.   Rockwell-Collins Hover Display 
 
According to a point paper prepared at the Army Aviation and Missile Research, 
Development, and Engineering Center, it would be easy to retrofit the UH-60A/L with 
this technology. [Ref. 13] 
A hover indicator provides the pilot with increased situational awareness, but does 
not assist in controlling the aircraft and is therefore only a partial solution.  To achieve 
the capability to approach and land without visual reference with satisfactory pilot 
workloads, the aircraft needs a hover-hold capability.  Hover-hold uses a digital flight 
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computer, coupled with the aircraft flight controls to maintain the aircraft’s attitude and 
position over the ground.   
With hover-hold, the number of axes that the pilot must control is reduced from 
four down to one.  This hover hold technology is also available on other commercial and 
military aircraft, and it has been demonstrated on the UH-60M prototype.  The UH-60M 
is able to achieve hover-hold through the dual digital flight control computer (DDFCC) 
upgrade.  The DDFCC upgrade essentially replaces the current UH-60 analog flight 
stability augmentation system (SAS) with a digital stability augmentation system coupled 
to the aircraft’s onboard flight control computer. 
The current special operations version of the UH-60, the MH-60K, has a hover-
hold capability and has hover symbology instrumentation.  This aircraft demonstrated the 
ability to operate safely in brown-out conditions during operation Iraqi Freedom.  The 
planned UH-60M will have similar flight handling characteristics to the MH-60K, which 
will allow the aircraft to meet all ORD threshold requirements, and will allow pilots to 
approach and land in severely degraded visual environments.   
Bringing the Army’s UH-60 fleet in line with the Special Operations MH-60K is 
not a full solution to the brown-out problem, however.  CW4 Savage, a former MH-60K 
instructor pilot and current project officer in the Systems Integration Management Office 
(SIMO) 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), made the following 
assessment: 
There are a lot of factors involved with a brown-out landing, and a 
DDFCC will not satisfy all those factors.  The only viable material 
solution is a change in the handling qualities that we will enjoy with fly-
by-wire.  DDFCC is certainly a benefit, and we use our AFCS in a Kilo in 
one of three brown-out landing techniques.  We are normally too heavy to 
use the AFCS to recover an aircraft in a brown-out, because the AFCS will 
exceed the environmental TQ limit of our engine, and droop the rotor.  
Our other two techniques the pilots use hover symbology to ensure there is 
no side drift, and to determine proximity to the ground as he flies the 
aircraft to the ground.  This requires a great deal of training to become 
proficient.  The Kilo that we rolled over in the desert was the result of an 
unexpected brown-out, and the pilot was unable to detect or correct a 
sideward drift.  This resulted in a dynamic rollover. 
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The DDFC upgrade in the UH-60M (increment 1) is only a partial solution to 
brown-out because it will also require extensive training in addition to the upgrade.  A 
full material solution to the problem will require new aircraft handling qualities, which 
will require an upgrade to a fly-by-wire flight control system.7 
The UH-60, like all other fielded Army helicopters, has mechanical flight 
controls.  This means that the aircraft cyclic, collective, and pedals are mechanically 
linked through push rods and cables to the main and tail rotor systems.  The UH-60 
cockpit flight controls are mechanically linked to hydraulic servos, which adjust the pitch 
and attitude of the rotor system. 
On a fly-by-wire flight control system, the cockpit flight controls (cyclic, pedals, 
and collective) send a digital signal to the flight control computer, which sends a digital 
signal to the hydraulic servos controlling the rotor system.  A fly-by-wire system would 
allow the UH-60 to adopt new helicopter control laws that would fundamentally change 
the handling characteristics and reduce the inherent instability of the aircraft at low 
airspeeds or hover.  Control laws refer to the manner in which the aircraft responds to 
control inputs from the pilots. 
Changing the UH-60 from its current control laws to velocity command control 
laws would allow the aircraft flight control computer to automatically adjust the aircraft 
attitude to maintain a constant velocity based on cyclic displacement.  The principal 
advantage of this system, as it relates to making a precision approach and landing in a 
DVE, is that if the pilot released the cyclic (to a neutral or zero displacement position) the 
aircraft will automatically assume zero velocity, or hover.  This effectively reduces the 
number of axes the pilot must control in order to hover from four to zero, and would 
eliminate any inherent instability of the aircraft at low airspeeds or hover. 
The current UH-60L has a flight control computer, but simply upgrading the 
computer will not allow the aircraft to adopt new control laws.  The existing flight control 
computer makes inputs to the flight control system through stability augmentation system 
                                                 
7 Source: Interview with Chris Blanken, Flight Control and Cockpit Integration 
Branch, Army/NASA Rotorcraft Division, Ames Research Center, Oct. 16, 2003. 
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actuators, which have only 10% control authority.  This means that the flight computer 
can only make small inputs to the rotor system in addition to the mechanical inputs made 
by the pilot.  This limited control authority is not sufficient to allow the computer to 
control the aircraft with velocity command control laws.  This is why the aircraft must be 
upgraded to a fly-by-wire system.8 
Equipping the UH-60X with fly-by-wire technology would allow the flight 
control computer 100 percent control authority over flight controls, which would allow 
the UH-60X to upgrade the flight control computer and adopt a velocity command 
system.  This would be a complete material solution to the problems posed by brown-out. 
Fly-by-wire technology is mature in both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.  It 
has been flying in commercial and military fixed wing aircraft for years. The Army’s 
Comanche helicopter has flight-tested fly-by-wire technology, to include application of 
translation rate control laws.  To date, however, no production rotary wing aircraft has 
been upgraded or modified to a fly-by-wire flight control system. “There may be some 
unknown unknowns... when dealing with something that has never been previously 
attempted, there is always the possibility that it simply won’t work.”9  The most 
significant are of technical risk is that the fly-by-wire system will require dramatic 
control inputs from the flight control computer, which may stress the airframe in 
unpredicted ways.  This, in turn, may require strengthening of the airframe which will 
increase the weight of the aircraft and decrease its lift capacity. 
 
2. Operation in Adverse Weather 
There are currently no program upgrades planned for the UH-60X that address the 
requirement to fly in a degraded visual environment caused by adverse weather 
(instrument meteorological conditions).  This technology exists, and is currently 
                                                 
8 Source: Interview with Chris Blanken, Flight Control and Cockpit Integration 
Branch, Army/NASA Rotorcraft Division, Ames Research Center, Oct. 16, 2003. 
9 Source: Interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) Donald R. Eaton, Logistics Chair, 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Nov. 4, 
2003. 
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employed on the special operations MH-47 helicopters.   The MH-47 employs a terrain 
following, terrain-avoidance multimode radar which enabled the aircraft to conduct 
precision troop insertion operations in Afghanistan in weather conditions of near-zero 
visibility. [Ref. 28] 
The MH-47 and the UH-60 have similar flight control systems and flight control 
computers, and use the same flight control laws.  From an engineering standpoint, 
adapting this technology from one helicopter platform to another is relatively 
straightforward and poses little technical risk.  The addition of the new radar equipment 
would add weight to the UH-60 platform, however, and might jeopardize the aircraft’s 
ability to meet threshold lift requirements. 
Table 2.   Technical Risk of Handling Characteristics Upgrades 
Capability Upgrade Technical Risk 
Land in brown-out conditions 
(with additional training) 
Dual digital flight controls Low (technology 
flight tested) 
Land in brown-out conditions 
(full material solution) 
Fly-by-wire flight control system, 
new control laws 
Medium (design 
iterations required) 
Precision troop insertions in 
adverse weather (IMC) 
Terrain following radar (not 





Requirement:  Improve aircraft survivability systems.   
The UH-60 ORD specifies that future aircraft must maintain at least the same 
radar cross-section and infra-red (IR) signature as the UH-60L.  The Army plans to 
reduce the IR signature of the UH-60 with an Improved Hover Infrared Suppression 
Subsystem (IHIRSS).  This study could obtain no technical information about the 
IHIRSS upgrade.  However, the plan to increase the lift capacity of the UH-60M involves 
the development of new engine that will operate at higher temperatures.  Unless the 
IHIRSS can offset the increased engine temperature, the UH-60X may have a larger IR 




Requirement:  Improve system reliability and maintainability.   
The UH-60 ORD specifies threshold and objective requirements for aircraft 
reliability.  It specifies a threshold requirement for mean time between failure (MTBF) of 
18 flight hours (21 flight hours is the objective) and a threshold requirement for mean 
time between maintenance (MTBM) of 4.5 flight hours (5.2 flight hours is the objective). 
The Army’s plan for the UH-60M includes a reliability improvement plan to 
reduce the operation and support costs and increase reliability.  The reliability projections 
for the UH-60M indicate “a nominal 15 to 20 percent improvement can be expected in 
overall UH-60M reliability and maintainability over the UH-60L”. [Ref. 11]  Projections 
indicate, however, that the UH-60M will not meet the threshold requirements for MTBF 
and MTBM. 
The plan to upgrade the UH-60A to the UH-60M includes replacing 75 depot-
level reparable (DLR) items with new or improved components.  In addition to replacing 
DLRs, the plan seeks to improve reliability by strengthening the airframe.10  Lessons 
learned from the UH-1 fleet, which is approaching 40 years of service, show that aging 
airframes begin to develop structural weakness in the cabin and tail sections of the 
airframe.   To address this issue, the entire cabin section of the airframe is being replaced 
with a new cabin that has a more robust design and is manufactured with improved 
composite materials.  The UH-60M upgrade also replaces the entire aircraft wiring 
system, strengthens the tail boom, and inspects the tail pylon for signs of structural 
fatigue.   
Mr. Lindell Whaley, a reliability and maintainability engineer for the Aviation 
and Missile Command Research and Development Center (AMRDEC), analyzed the UH-
60M upgrade program and developed a reliability growth model to estimate the 
achievable reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) values for the UH-60M 
aircraft.  To develop his model, Mr. Whaley used historical maintenance data from the 
                                                 
10 Source: Interview with Mr. Bill Hanks, UH-60 Systems Engineering Integrated 
Product Team Leader, 15 October, 2003 
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Army’s UH-60A and UH-60L fleet, as well as data supplied by Sikorsky.  Mr. Whaley 
adjusted his model to include design modifications for the UH-60M. 
The reliability growth model predicts the UH-60M will have a mean time between 
failure (MTBF) of 15.3 flight hours, and a mean time between maintenance (MTBM) of 
4.3 flight hours. [Ref. 11]  The largest factors accounting for the projected increases in 
reliability of the UH-60M over the UH-60L are:  (1) a reduction in aircraft vibrations due 
to the introduction of the Active Vibration Control System (AVCS).  The AVCS will 
provide an estimated 5 to 10 percent reduction in incidents related to airframe cracking, 
popped rivets, loose hardware, and avionics failures, (2) the elimination of the currently 
required battery and rotor blade indicator inspections, which is estimated to reduce 
overall required inspections by 5 percent, and (3) an estimated 10 percent reduction in 
maintenance of structural components, drive subsystems, and airframe-mounted 
components due to decreased vibration. 
Although the UH-60M is projected to fall slightly short of the threshold 
requirements for MTBF of 18 hours and MTBM of 4.5 hours, and fall significantly short 
of the 21 hour MTBF and 5.2 hour MTBM objective requirements, it may still be feasible 
for the UH-60X to meet these requirements.  The UH-60X improved turbine engine is 
projected to be 20 percent more reliable than the current 701D engine in the UH-60M.  
The fly-by-wire flight control system eliminates 471 mechanical parts and is projected to 
improve the reliability of the flight control system by over 200 percent, according to 
Utility Helicopter project office estimates.  Using Mr. Whaley’s methodology to adjust 
the reliability model to account for these two changes alone would allow the UH-60X to 
meet the Army’s threshold requirement for MTBM of 4.5 flight hours.11  This analysis, 
however, is based on UH-60M projected improvements that rely heavily on reduced 
vibration.  The true extent to which vibration is reduced cannot be known without actual 
flight-test data. 
Michael E. Ryan, in his master’s thesis, The Reliability Challenge:  Common 
Pitfalls, and Strategies for Maximizing Inherent Reliability Performance of Weapon 
                                                 
11 Source: Interview with Mr. Lindell Whaley, Nov. 2003. 
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Systems concludes that “Demonstration of required reliability performance levels prior to 
system fielding has remained a challenge for the Army, and in recent years, the success 
rate of systems achieving their stated reliability performance in operational tests has 
declined.”  He cites the Army Test and Evaluation Command’s (ATEC) claim that from 
1998-2000 only 36 percent of Army systems in development or operational testing were 
able to demonstrate the required mean time between failures (MTBF).  Of those programs 
that failed, 61 percent failed to achieve half of their reliability requirement. [Ref. 51, p. 
25] 
Considering that Army systems historically fail to meet reliability targets, and 
considering that reliability predictions are based on models, rather than actual testing 
data, there appears to be at least some probability that an upgraded and recapitalized UH-
60 fleet would not meet supportability requirements as specified in the ORD.   This 
makes the supportability risk level moderate, using the program office definitions of 
supportability risk.  Low supportability risk implies that the system is likely to meet 
reliability targets. 
 
G.  PROJECTED UPGRADE COSTS 
 This chapter makes estimates regarding the technical feasibility of upgrading the 
UH-60 fleet to meet more aggressive performance requirements.  The chapter does not 
offer a thorough analysis of what the unit cost of the UH-60X would be.  There are many 
variables that will affect unit cost, and members of the UH-PMO are not yet able to assert 
what the UH-60X would cost while in full-rate production.  As a rough estimate, the 
Program Manager suggests that for the purpose of our analysis, an upgraded UH-60X that 
meets all requirements might have a unit production cost of approximately $15 million12. 
Certain elements of the upgrade program have been examined in sufficient detail 
to develop cost estimates.  The fly-by-wire upgrade is projected to have RDT&E costs of 
                                                 




$55 million and increase the unit production cost of the helicopter by $600,00013.  The 
Army’s new engine program ITEP has an RDT&E budget of $275 million, and is 
expected to have a unit production cost of one million dollars, which is approximately 
$350,000 more than the current production engine in the UH-60M14.  The Project Office 
does not have official estimates for upgrading the transmission and drive train, which is 
necessary to capitalize on the increased power of the new engines.  The transmission and 
gearboxes from Sikorsky’s new H-92 are sufficient to meet power requirements, and will 
fit into the UH-60 airframe.  The H-92 transmission and gearboxes cost approximately 
$500,000 more to manufacture than the current UH-60M transmission and gearboxes15.  
This might be a reasonable estimate for the transmission and drive train upgrade 
production costs.  
 
H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
It appears technically feasible that the UH-60 fleet can be upgraded to meet the 
Army’s 9,000-pound lift requirement at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees with the development 
of an improved engine, transmission, and rotor system – which will require airframe 
modifications.  There appears to be little cost, schedule, or performance risk with the 
Army’s ten-year plan to develop the new engine.  There may be significant technical risk, 
however, in modifying the airframe to accommodate a larger rotor system. 
It is also technically feasible to improve the flight handling characteristics of the 
UH-60 and improve its performance in a degraded visual environment (DVE).  The 
technology required to allow the aircraft to operate in all weather environments is also 
mature, and although no program is currently planned or funded, there is little technical 
or performance risk.  Fully meeting the Army’s future requirements for improved flight 
handling qualities, however, will require equipping the UH-60 with a fly-by-wire flight 
                                                 
13 Interview with COL William Lake, Program Manager, Utility Helicopters, 17 Dec 
2003. 
14 Interview with COL William Lake, Program Manager, Utility Helicopters, 17 Dec 
2003. 
 15 Interview with Mr. Andy Kieth, Manager, Sikorsky U.S. Government Advanced 
Designs. 
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control system and adopting new flight control laws.  Fly-by-wire technology and 
velocity command control laws are both mature technologies, and have been 
demonstrated on the Army’s Comanche prototypes, but no existing production aircraft 
(rotary or fixed wing) has ever been upgraded or modified to a fly-by-wire system.  This 
upgrade should be considered moderate technical risk because design iterations and 
testing are required. 
The UH-60 may be able to meet the Army’s requirement for increased reliability.  
Computer modeling and analysis indicates the UH-60M will be able to achieve moderate 
(10-15 percent) improvements over the UH-60L. [Ref. 11, p. 11] Modeling and analysis 
show that the UH-60M will fall short, however, of the Army’s requirement for MTBF 
and MTBM.  Adjusting the UH-60M reliability growth model to include the increased 
reliability that is projected for the improved turbine engine and fly-by-wire flight control 
system indicates that the UH-60X might meet the requirements for both MTBF and 
MTBM.  This should be treated as an area of moderate risk, however, because the 
analysis is based on computer models of projected component performance, not flight-
test data.  A summary of the various UH-60 models’ performance is shown in the chart 
below. 
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Table 3.   UH-60 Models Performance Comparison Chart 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF MATERIEL ALTERNATIVES TO THE UH-60 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the material alternatives to meeting the 
Army’s future utility helicopter requirements.  The current utility helicopter fleet does not 
meet requirements, nor does the planned version of the UH-60M that is in the prototype 
phase of development.  As noted previously in this report, there are essentially three 
material alternatives to meet future requirements: (1) make further upgrades to the 
existing fleet in order to meet requirements, (2) procure a non-developmental item (NDI) 
aircraft which meets requirements, and (3) start a new acquisition program to design an 
aircraft which meets requirements.  This chapter addresses alternatives two and three. 
 
B. NON-DEVELOPMENTAL ITEMS 
A market survey was conducted to select aircraft for consideration from among all 
domestic and international production aircraft.  According to Jane’s All the World’s 
Aircraft there are 147 rotary wing aircraft currently in production.  Of these 147, 75 are 
considered utility helicopters. [Ref. 58, p. 27]  To narrow the field of options, the aircraft 
can be screened according to maximum external lift capability.  Because the Army has a 
requirement for 9,000 pounds of lift capacity, aircraft with maximum external lift 
capacity below 9,000 pounds can be screened from further consideration.  The eight 
helicopters meeting these initial screening criteria are listed below. 
Table 4.   NDI Aircraft Lift Capacity at Sea Level 
Aircraft Maximum External Lift (pounds) 
Mil Mi-26 44,090 
Mil Mi-38 15,432 
Mil Mi-17 11,023 
Boeing CH-47D 28,000 
Sikorsky UH-60L 9,000 
EH Industries EH101 12,000 
Eurocopter Super Puma Mk II 11,023 
Sikorsky H-92 10,000 
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Due to regional economic instability and longstanding political alliances, it seems 
unlikely that the United States would consider the purchase of a Russian Federation 
aircraft, so the three Russian Federation Mil helicopters can also be screened from further 
consideration.  This leaves five production aircraft for consideration, one of which is the 
Army’s current UH-60L, which does not meet future requirements.  This section of the 
paper examines the remaining five aircraft in greater detail; specifically with respect to 
how well each might meet the Army’s future requirements for lift capacity, 
interoperability, flight handling characteristics, and survivability. 
 
1. Lift Capacity 
The Army has identified a requirement for a 9,000-pound external load capability 
at 4000 feet pressure altitude and 95 degrees Fahrenheit.  However, specific information 
about aircraft performance at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees is not readily available for 
aircraft manufactured outside the United States.  Table 5 shows the maximum external 
lift capacity of each aircraft at sea level as cited in Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. 
Table 5.   Lift Capacity of NDI Alternatives 
Aircraft Max 
external 




(lbs) at 4000 











UH-60L 9,000 6,300 11,516 3,800 2.37 3.03 
CH-47D 28,000 19,600 25,463 8,150 3.44 3.12 
H-92 10,000 7,000 15,200 4,068 2.46 3.74 
EH101 12,000 8,400 20,613 6,000 2.00 3.44 
Super 
Puma 
11,000 7,700 10,900 3,314 3.32 3.29 
Source: Ref. 58 
A simple technique to estimate aircraft performance at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees 
is to compare the lift capacity of the Army’s current UH-60L at sea level with its lift 
capacity at 4,000 feet.  The UH-60L loses approximately 30 percent of its lift capability 
between sea level and 4,000 feet.  Using this as a general approximation, it is possible to 
roughly estimate the performance of each aircraft at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees by 
reducing its performance at sea level by 30 percent. 
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Using this estimation technique, only the CH-47 meets the Army’s lift 
requirement, although the EH101 is too close to rule out on the basis of a general 
estimate.  It seems almost certain, however, that both the H-92 and the Super Puma 
would require modification to meet the lift capacity requirement. 
 
2. Interoperability 
In order to be interoperable with the Army’s future digital forces, an aircraft must: 
(1) have a system architecture including the MIL-STD-1553 data bus, (2) be able to 
accept the new Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) currently under development, and (3) 
have an open systems architecture that will support integration of future digital command 
and control systems.  Both the EH101 and the H-92 have the MIL-STD-1553 data bus 
and would likely require little modification for interoperability.  Neither the current 
production CH-47 nor the UH-60 has the MIL-STD-1553 data bus, although the 
upgraded MH-47E does.  The Super Puma does not support the MIL-STD-1553 data bus.  
The current production versions of the UH-60, CH-47, and Super Puma would require 
modification and design integration to achieve the required interoperability. 
 
3. Flight Handling Characteristics 
Fully meeting the Army’s requirement for improved flight handling 
characteristics will require an aircraft optimized for operations in a degraded visual 
environment (DVE) with the capability to conduct precision troop insertions in all 
weather and environmental conditions.  To meet this requirement an aircraft will need a 
fly-by-wire flight control system with new flight control laws and some form of 
integrated terrain-following radar or forward-looking infrared (FLIR) radar. 
None of the production aircraft under consideration are fly-by-wire.  The only 
production helicopters in the world with a fly-by-wire flight control system are the U.S. 
Army’s Comanche and the French NIH-90, both of which are still in the prototype phase.  
(The NIH-90 is a utility helicopter but was screened from consideration because it did not 
meet lift criteria.) 
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The H-92 and the EH101 were both designed with optional FLIR, and the H-92 
was designed with optional terrain-following radar.  Upgraded versions of the CH-47 
have been modified with terrain-following radar, and have demonstrated the ability to 
operate in all weather conditions.  The Super Puma does not have FLIR or terrain-
following radar.  Consequently, none of the NDI alternatives will meet the Army’s 
requirement for improved flight handling characteristics without modification. 
 
4, Survivability 
The Army threshold requirement for survivability dictates that future utility 
helicopters have an aircraft survivability suite at least equal to that of the UH-60, and 
have a radar cross-section and IR signature not greater than that of the current UH-60L. 
The UH-60L is approximately 65 feet long and does not use stealth technology to 
minimize its radar cross-section.  It has two 1,860 shaft horsepower (SHP) engines, and is 
equipped with an exhaust suppression system that reduces the engines’ IR signature.  The 
UH-60L is also equipped with a threat radar detection system, a threat radar 
countermeasure (chaff), and a countermeasure to reduce the effectiveness of incoming IR 
seeking missiles.  Finally, the aircraft is equipped with two 7.62 mm machine guns and 
provides armament protection for the crew against small arms fire up to 7.62 mm. 
Radar cross-section is basically a function of aircraft size.  Without some type of 
radar cross-section reduction (i.e., stealth) measures, larger aircraft will have larger radar 
cross-sections.  None of the NDI aircraft have any stealth characteristics.  The CH-47 and 
the EH101 are significantly larger than the UH-60L, and will have larger radar cross-
sections.  The H-92 is five feet longer than the UH-60L and can be estimated to have a 
slightly larger radar cross section. 
Countermeasures are considered mission equipment and would likely be easy to 
integrate into any of the NDI aircraft under consideration.  Unlike radar cross-section, the 
UH-60 countermeasure suite could be integrated into any new production aircraft. 
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Survivability attributes of the five NDI alternatives are outline in the table below.  
Of the five, only the UH-60L meets the UH-60’s survivability threshold requirements 
without modification. 
Table 6.   NDI Survivability Characteristics 
 UH-60L EH101 CH-47D Super Puma H-92 
Length 64’ 75’ 99’ 64’ 69’ 
Radar Warning 
Receiver (RWR) 












IR suppression Yes No No No 
Chaff dispenser Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Flare dispenser No Yes Yes Yes 
Ballistic tolerance to 
7.62mm 

































Data Source: Ref. 58 
In summary, as explained in the table below, there is no helicopter currently in 
production that will meet the Army’s Objective Force requirements.  Adopting any of 
these existing helicopters would require an unacceptable decrease in Objective Force 
requirements. 
Table 7.   NDI Comparative Summary 
 UH-60L EH101 CH-47D Super Puma H-92 
Lift capacity 
(9000 lbs at 4000 



















































Purchase price in 
millions  (2003 
dollars) 
$9.2 $24.5 $32 $16.3 $14 
Data Source: Ref. 58 
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 C. NEW ACQUISITION PROGRAM 
Estimating the cost of a new acquisition program is difficult, particularly when 
there are requirements to incorporate new technologies.  There are many interdependent 
variables to consider, and cost overruns in the defense industry are common.  A technique 
to estimate design and development costs for a new acquisition program would be to 
average the three most recent utility helicopter development programs.  Jane’s All the 
World’s Aircraft lists design and development costs for the EH-101, H-92, and NH-90 as 
shown in the table below.  Also included in the table below are the design and 
development costs for the UH-60 as provided by the Project Management Office.  Using 
these programs as a baseline, the cost of an average utility helicopter design and 
development program can be estimated at approximately $989 million.  The time to 
develop each aircraft in the sample, computed as the time between the initiation of 
concept development and the delivery date of the first production aircraft, yields an 
average development time of about 14 years.   
Table 8.   Utility Helicopter Development Costs and Timelines 
Helicopter Design Cost (2003 dollars) Time to Develop 
EH-101 $456M 14 years 
H-92 $600M 12 years 
NH-90 $1.6B 18 years (delivery projected 
in early 2004) 
UH-60 $1.3B 11 years 
Source: Ref. 58 
It is possible to estimate the unit procurement cost of a potential new aircraft 
using the parametric estimation method.    According to the Utility Helicopters Project 
Office, the three main cost drivers on utility helicopters are the engine, transmission, and 
rotor system.  These three components make up the aircraft drive train, and drive train 
determines lift capacity.  A comparison of maximum external lift capacity to average unit 
procurement cost reveals that there is a positive linear relationship (with a correlation 
coefficient of approximately 0.85) between lift capacity and unit cost (assuming unit 
price equals unit cost for the aircraft.)  A regression analysis of the NDI alternatives 
considered in this chapter suggests that a potential new aircraft meeting the Army’s 
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external lift requirements would have an average unit procurement cost of approximately 
$18.3 million16.  Figure 5 shows the average unit procurement cost of the five NDI 
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Figure 4.   Cost Trend Analysis Based on Payload 
 
To produce an aircraft with maximum external lift capacity greater than the H-92, 
but less than the CH-47, it would be reasonable to estimate that the unit cost would be 
approximately $18.3 million. 
 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter presents analysis to suggest that there is not a helicopter currently in 
production in the world that can meet the Army’s Objective Force requirements.  The 
chapter also provides analysis to indicate that a new acquisition program would require 
                                                 
16 Assuming aircraft lose approximately 30 percent of sea-level lift capacity at 4,000 
feet, the Army would need an aircraft capable of lifting approximately 13,000 pounds at 
sea level to meet requirements. 
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on the order of about 14 years and $989 million for development, and would produce 
helicopters with an average unit procurement cost of approximately $18.3 million. 
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VII. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
As noted in Chapters I and II, the Army conducted its most recent evaluation of 
the requirements for the Utility Helicopter fleet in 2000.  This evaluation resulted in a 
plan to provide an incrementally more capable fleet, first with the UH-60M starting in 
2007, then with the FUR starting in about 2015.   
Since 2000, Department of Defense needs and priorities have since changed.  The 
Aviation Director of Combat Developments, the Utility Helicopters Project Office and 
others recognize the need to review requirements and acquisition strategies in light of 
these changes.  This chapter makes recommendations for consideration for the new 
requirements generation process and the analysis of alternatives that precedes the 
selection of a new acquisition strategy. 
 
B. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. UH-60M Upgrade Program 
Implement Fly-by-Wire.  The UH-60’s lack of improved flight handling 
characteristics is a serious requirements shortfall, given the Army requirement to conduct 
precision troop and equipment insertions in all weather and environmental conditions. 
In the current two conflicts, more utility aircraft have been lost due to brown-out 
accidents than any other cause, including enemy fire.  As the Army focuses more on 
asymmetric conflicts, all-weather operation becomes more critical.  In a symmetric 
battlefield, bad weather tends to affect both forces engaged.  In an asymmetric conflict, 
however, where the United States and its allies are the only force with a significant 
aviation capability, poor weather will limit friendly capabilities more than the enemy’s.  
Without an all-weather capability, inclement weather favors enemy operations. 
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A fly-by-wire flight control system is needed to meet these requirements, as well 
as meeting lift and supportability requirements.  Because no production aircraft has ever 
been upgraded to a fly-by-wire flight control system, though, this entails moderate 
technical risk.  A fly-by-wire flight control system may stress the airframe in 
unpredictable ways, which may require airframe strengthening or other modifications, 
which may affect aircraft weight or center of gravity.   
The Utility Helicopter project office estimates that the fly-by-wire upgrade 
program will have RDT&E costs of $55 million dollars, and increase the average unit 
procurement cost of the UH-60M by $600,000.  Fully funding the fly-by-wire program 
and accelerating its introduction, beginning in fiscal year 2007 if possible, will fulfill a 
crucial component of the acquisition strategy and provide critical operational capability.   
Upgrade the UH-60M engine.  The Army must develop a new, more powerful 
engine to meet lift requirements, whether it pursues the UH-60X upgrade program or a 
new aircraft design program.  Designing the new engine to be compatible with the current 
UH-60M drive train will allow integration of the new engine into the UH-60M upgrade 
program.   
The new, more powerful engine could be governed to prevent over-torques, and 
allow the aircraft to operate up to the limits of the existing transmission.  Given the 
existing drive train limitations, the UH-60M could lift up to 7,600 pounds at 4,000 feet 
and 95 degrees with more powerful engines.  This would be a 27 percent increase in 
maximum lift capacity over the current UH-60M. 
The Utility Helicopter project office estimates that the proposed new engine 
developed through the Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) would have a unit cost 
of roughly $1 million, which is approximately $350,000 more than the current 701D 
engine in the UH-60M.  This would increase the average unit procurement cost of the 
UH-60M from $10.6 million to $11.0 million.  This appears to be a very cost effective 
upgrade, increasing lift capacity by 27 percent while only increasing unit cost by 4 
percent, and allowing the Army to capitalize on the significant RDT&E cost of the new 
engine for the UH-60X/FUR program. 
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 2. UH-60X / Future Utility Rotorcraft 
Non-developmental aircraft do not meet Army requirements.  No aircraft 
currently in production meets the Army’s requirements for lift capacity and improved 
flight handling characteristics.  The only aircraft in production that meets the Army’s lift 
requirement is the CH-47, which does not meet survivability or flight handling 
characteristics.  The only fly-by-wire aircraft currently in production is the French NH-
90, which was screened from consideration due to insufficient lift. 
Pursue a new utility helicopter to meet Future Utility Rotorcraft 
requirements.  Meeting requirements by making further modifications to the current 
UH-60M upgrade plan appears to be more affordable than a new acquisition program, at 
least in the short term.  The Army’s Utility Helicopter Project Office estimates that 
producing an upgraded UH-60X that meets all requirements will have an average unit 
procurement cost of roughly $15 million per helicopter.17  Parametric estimates for a new 
acquisition program suggest that a new utility helicopter meeting lift capacity 
requirements might have an average unit procurement cost of approximately $18.3 
million. However, evolving the UH-60M to the UH-60X involves high technical risk, 
according to program definitions of risk.  Ultimately, even if none of the technical risks 
develop into significant cost or schedule overruns, and the UH-60X meets performance 
thresholds, the Army will have a $15 million upgrade to a 20-year old (plus) airframe that 
marginally meets a lift requirement written in 1999.  The Army should consider a new 
acquisition program to design a new aircraft to meet Objective Force requirements.  The 
new aircraft could be designed around an improved engine that could be retrofitted to the 
current UH-60M.  This would allow the Army to capitalize on the engine design cost for 
its new helicopter and provide significant increased lift capability for the rest of the utility 
helicopter fleet. 
Re-evaluate the 9,000 pound external lift requirement in light of cost data. 
An analysis of alternatives using cost as an independent variable (CAIV) analysis would 
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17 Interview with Colonel William Lake, Project Manager, Utility Helicopters, 17 
Dec 2003. 
determine the program risk associated with stretching the UH-60 airframe to achieve the 
full 9,000-pound lift requirement.  Initial engineering estimates indicate that a new engine 
and transmission, with the existing rotor system, would allow the UH-60M to lift 8,600 
pounds at 4,000 feet and 95 degrees. This upgrade would increase the unit production 
cost of the UH-60M by approximately $850,000.  Further increasing lift capacity to 9,000 
pounds will require a larger rotor system, which in turn requires extending the airframe to 
provide clearance between the main and tail rotors.  This upgrade might increase the unit 
production cost by as much as an additional $3 million.   
 Our analysis suggests that a UH-60 with an improved engine, transmission, and 
fly-by-wire capability will cost $12 million and provide 8600 pounds external lift.  As 
previously mentioned, the UH-60X will provide 9000 pounds lift and cost approximately 
$15 million.  It seems that increasing lift from 8600 pounds to 9000 pounds will cost 
about $3 million.  We recommend that the Army study the impact of reducing the 
objective lift requirement to the more affordable 8600 pounds.  
A near-term alternative to lengthening the UH-60 airframe is to transfer some 
utility helicopter tasks to the CH-47, especially considering that an upgraded UH-60M 
might only fall 400 pounds short of the Objective Force lift requirement.  The chart 
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Figure 5.   Cost vs. Lift Capabilities of UH-60 Upgrades 
 
Study the cost and feasibility of a single new development aircraft to fulfill 
both utility and cargo roles in the Objective Force.  Objective Force literature 
(specifically the FCS ORD) describes roles for the UH-60 and the CH-47 that are quite 
similar.  The practice of maintaining two platforms to fulfill the single basic mission of 
aerial transport contradicts the stated Objective Force goals of non-contiguous operations, 
reach-back logistics, systems commonality, and exceptional reliability.  If affordable, a 
future cargo/utility rotorcraft capable of both the UH-60’s versatility and the CH-47’s 
cargo capacity, with increased reliability, supportability, and survivability, could be the 
ideal solution to Objective Force requirements, especially if developed in coordination 
with a system to fulfill the requirements the Army has identified for an Air Mobility 
Transport – Tilt Rotor (AMT-T)-like heavy transport capability. 
 
3. Requirements Determination 
Define requirements in terms of capabilities.  When determining both 
requirements and the criteria for the analysis of alternatives, consider the shift away from 
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threat-based requirements to capabilities-based requirements.  In light of the Department 
of Defense’s current and probable future emphasis on inter-service integration, including 
commonality of processes and equipment, the requirements development effort for the 
FUR requires the fullest possible representation from other services and agencies 
Quantify all requirements.  Some of the requirements identified in the ORD for 
the UH-60M and the FUR are not quantitatively defined.  For example, neither 
survivability nor supportability requirements are well-defined in Objective Force 
literature, and consequently are not well-addressed in the UH-60 ORD.  Specifically 
quantifying requirements wherever possible strengthens them against misinterpretation.   
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APPENDIX A. DETAILED OBJECTIVE FORCE UTILITY 
HELICOPTER REQUIREMENTS  
Table 9.   Objective Force Specified Utility Lift References 
Source Objective Force Requirement 
FCS ORD 2952 “All FCS UMS [unmanned systems] must be capable of being carried 
during AASLT/air mobile by UH-60 and/or CH-47 helicopters in a 
high altitude, (4,000 foot pressure altitude), hot temperature (95 
degrees F.) scenario for a radius of at least 75-150 km. The vehicle 
operators/crew will travel inside the helicopter and will be considered 
as part of the helicopter cargo. (Objective)” 
FCS ORD 3828 “A fully loaded FCS ARV-A (L) must be carried by UH-60 with one 
of these platforms per helicopter under high-hot conditions, with 
supplies and with the operators and their equipment inside the 
helicopter. (Threshold)”  The ARV-A(L) is expected to have a full 
combat weight of approximately 2.5 tons, including a basic load of 
1000 7.62mm rounds and 2 Javelin missiles. [Ref. 40, p. 3-18] 
FCS ORD 1341 “A fully loaded FCS MULE must be carried by UH-60 with one of 
these platforms per helicopter under high-hot conditions, with 
supplies and with the operators and their equipment inside the 
helicopter. (Threshold)”  The MULE is expected to have a full 
combat weight of approximately 2.5 tons, [Ref. 40, p. 3-18] including 
2400 pounds of squad/platoon equipment and supplies. [Ref. 34, p. E-
2-B-2] 
FCS ORD 3264 “The [NLOS-LS] launch unit must be transportable by (sling load) 
UH-60.”  The NLOS-LS is expected to have a full combat weight of 
1.4 tons, including a basic load of 15 missiles. [Ref. 40, p. 3-26] 
FCS ORD p. G-3 “The UH-60 Black Hawk will provide lift, command and control, and 
logistical support to units in the FCS-equipped UA Force. It will 
operationally and tactically move forces throughout the battlespace to 
achieve full spectrum dominance.” 
UA O&O p. 4-49 “The UE utility aircraft that support the air assault are equipped with 
the same COP [common operating picture] as the ground element.” 
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Table 10.   Objective Force Responsiveness and Deployability Requirements 
Source Objective Force Requirement 
FCS ORD 1015, 
1021 
Employ and return over operational distances of up to 475 kilometers 
(400 km operational movement plus 75 km tactical radius) without 
in-flight re-supply, to keep pace with Objective Force ground 
maneuver during the initial stages of a campaign. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.21 
Self-deploy worldwide and be rapidly operational with minimal 
support upon arrival.  Be air-transportable with minimal preparation 
effort.  Operate in and from unimproved areas.  Conduct shipboard 
operations. 
 
Table 11.   Objective Force Agility and Versatility Requirements 
Source Objective Force Requirement 
OF Avn Concept 
p.18, FCS ORD 
1020 
Operate precisely, effectively and continuously (24 hours a day) over 
a non-contiguous battlefield, in any threat environment, day and 
night, in a wide assortment of terrain, weather, and visibility, in order 
to enable the Objective Force to conduct full spectrum operations. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.21 
Perform internal cargo transport with rapid loading and unloading, 
requiring minimum manpower, to include pallets able to be 
preloaded, rolled onto cargo aircraft, dropped at unit locations for 
unloading, and recovered on the next airlift mission.  Perform 
external cargo transport with automatic hookup and sling load 
stabilization. 
FCS ORD 1159 Accomplish position/navigation (horizontal and vertical) to within 
one meter error with a low probability of detection or interception 
and in the presence of electronic jamming, to enable precision 
maneuver and improve survivability. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.19 
Employ cognitive tools to aid crew members in system awareness and 
mission management during execution, allowing the crew to operate 
with their "eyes out of the cockpit" by monitoring aircraft status, 
assisting in communication, route planning, threat detection, and 
countermeasures. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.22 
Provide mobile command posts that can operate on the ground and in 
the air, stationary or on the move.  System must have NLOS 
communications capability.  System must be interoperable across 
Army and joint C2 systems.  System must be deployable, and air 
transportable.   
OF Avn Concept 
p.24 
Design aviation units “with enough subordinate units to rotate them 
into and out of action without diminishing engagement tempo and 
intensity.”  Units will be modular, tailorable and standardized 
between echelons and components of the force. 
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Table 12.   Objective Force Survivability and Lethality Requirements 
Source Objective Force Requirement 
OF Avn Concept 
p.20, FCS ORD 
1243 
Employ passive aircraft survival by avoiding detection by the threat, 
through the balanced use of signature reduction, low observables, SA, 
and systems capable of providing warning about the total spectrum of 
ground and air threats. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.20 
Employ active aircraft survival by neutralizing threat detection 
acquisition, and by countering weapon systems through active 
countermeasures, or by attacking with fire and forget, rapid-reaction 
weapons at maximum ranges. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.20, FCS ORD 
3708, 3709 
Detect and avoid chemical, biological, and radiological 
contamination and, if exposed, to be rapidly and safely 
decontaminated.  Be fully survivable against the effects of electro-
magnetic pulse, and hardened against the material damaging effects 
of contaminants and decontaminants. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.20 
Detect and avoid natural and man-made obstacles to include anti-
helicopter mines, wires and cables. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.20 
Survive ballistic impact, thermal, and overpressure effects of 
weapons. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.20 
Protect crew and passengers from injury in aircraft accidents.  
Minimize aircraft and systems damage in accidents. 
FCS ORD 3567 From standoff range, detect, identify, report through the C4ISR 
architecture, mark, and neutralize ground-to-air threats, to improve 
survivability on a non-contiguous battlefield. 
FCS ORD 2838 Be capable of directing precision, cooperative NLOS effects, to 
preserve the system’s own freedom of movement in the presence of 
threats. 
FCS ORD KPP 7 Be capable of dash speed in order to escape threats that cannot be 
otherwise countered. 




Table 13.   Objective Force Sustainability Requirements 
Source Objective Force Requirement 
FCS ORD KPP 5 Significantly reduce logistics footprints and personnel efficiencies in 
the area of operations through reduced demand for maintenance and 
supply. 
FCS ORD 1239, 
3806 
Increase systems reliability and availability, commensurate with 
ground maneuver system improvements, to reduce maintenance 
requirements. 
FCS ORD 1240 Incorporate an embedded readiness system that monitors the status of 
components/subsystems, crew, and consumables, forecasts equipment 
degradation/failure and communicates real-time system readiness 
status across the battle command network. 
OF Avn Concept 
pp.15, 27 
Standardize aircraft components to facilitate logistics support, and 
incorporate open system design where new must integrate with the 
old.. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.22 
Improve ground maintenance efficiency through diagnostic, 
prognostic and expert systems to isolate failures and potential 
failures, and to optimize maintenance scheduling.  Maximize the use 
of common tools and equipment, and minimize peculiar support 
equipment. 
FCS ORD p. 65 Be fully supported by a two level maintenance system of field 
maintenance (consisting of on-system component replacement) and 
sustainment maintenance (consisting of off-system component 
repair). 
OF Avn Concept 
p.22 
Reconfigure systems in response to component degradation or failure 




Table 14.   Objective Force Information and Interoperability Requirements 
Source Objective Force Requirement 
OF Avn Concept 
p.19, FCS ORD 
1016  
Integrate into the Objective Force mission planning and rehearsal 
system during movement by air, land, and sea, in order to ensure 
effective situational understanding and airspace utilization.  Have the 
capability to plan, rehearse, re-plan, and revise aviation missions 
enroute, and readily communicate with adjacent and theater-wide 
mission planning systems. 
FCS ORD KPP 2 Integrate into the Objective Force battle command network and 
airspace management systems, and provide situational awareness at 
the platform level, to enable distributed operations. 
OF Avn Concept 
p.18 
Be capable of inter-theater secure, jam-resistant, air-to-ground, 
ground-to-air, and air-to-air transmission and receipt of voice and 
data secure communications while in nap-of-the-earth flight 
conditions in both LOS and NLOS situations.   
OF Avn Concept 
p.18 
Employ data transmission rates fast enough to permit rapid handover 
of voluminous messages and situational awareness data.  
OF Avn Concept 
pp.18, 26, FCS 
ORD 1120 
Employ communications systems compliant and interoperable with 
Army, joint, combined, coalition, and interagency voice, data, and 
imagery communication standards, that degrade gracefully when 
components fail, are hardened against information warfare threats, 
and will support all top-level FCS and Objective Force information 
exchange requirements (IERs). 
FCS ORD 1093 Include networked, embedded, virtual, Full Task Training (FTT) to 
support individual, crew, and multi-echelon training without 
reconfiguration of the equipment. 
FCS ORD 2850 Provide combat identification (CID) of friend or unknown in a Joint/ 
Allied/Coalition environment to the individual soldier level under all 
battlefield and weather conditions across the spectrum of operations, 
compatible with the Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS) 
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APPENDIX B. RISK MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY 
The basic strategy of the UH-60M risk management approach is to identify 
critical areas and risk events, both technical and non-technical, and take necessary actions 
to prevent cost, schedule, and/or performance impacts.  The IPTs serve as the key focal 
point for accomplishing risk management activities and performing the risk management 
process.  This approach allows the UH-60M project to gain multi-functional information 
from team members with functional expertise in all areas. 
Integrated risk management efforts focus on monitoring and managing program 
elements which may impact the success of the program by utilizing technical 
performance measurement, cost, and schedule tools, in existence and in use by the PM 
and the Contractor.  Identification of these areas through the IPT process may result in 
further evaluation of the risk management process and the identification of new risk 
elements.  The continuous feedback and update cycle of the RMP provide the UH-60M 
program with the means to predict future resource requirements, as well as manage near 
term goals. 
The risk management process identifies a hierarchy of risks that may potentially 
impact the successful achievement of program goals, objectives, thresholds, and/or 
established program milestone exit criteria.  For consistency throughout the program, the 
risk level definitions in have been developed. 
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 Table 15.   Risk Management Matrix 
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